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I. INTRODUCTION
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,1 the Supreme Court rejected the
narrow “cause of action” test announced in Hurn v. Oursler2 for what was
then termed pendent-claim jurisdiction in favor of a broader “common
nucleus of operative fact” standard.3 In subsequent cases, the Court in
dicta implied, without deciding, that the same standard might govern other
extensions of federal court jurisdiction to non-diverse state law claims
incident to federal question or diversity claims falling within Article III of
the U.S. Constitution in the related but distinct contexts of “pendent party”
and “ancillary”4 jurisdiction.5 Meanwhile, cases in the lower courts tended

1. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
2. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
3. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
4. Before the enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990 § 310, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), the term “pendent claim” jurisdiction was used to refer
to the power of a federal court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a state law claim brought
by a plaintiff against a non-diverse defendant against whom the plaintiff had also asserted a federal
claim. The term “pendent party” jurisdiction referred to federal court jurisdiction over a nonjurisdictional claim included in the original complaint by additional plaintiffs or against additional
defendants joined under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incident to the court’s
jurisdiction over a claim falling within federal jurisdiction. The term “ancillary” jurisdiction
referred to a federal court’s power over non-jurisdictional claims asserted by defending parties or
by or against additional parties subsequent to the filing of the original complaint. See generally 13B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3567–67.2 (2d ed. 1984
& Supp. 2007); C. Douglas Floyd, The ALI, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Constitutional Case, 1995 BYU L. REV. 819, 827–57 [hereinafter Floyd, Supplemental
Jurisdiction]; Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After
Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 447–48 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989), superceded by statute,
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to equate the Gibbs standard with the “same transaction or occurrence”
joinder standard that pervades the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
The 1990 supplemental-jurisdiction statute included these three
previously distinct doctrines under a single rubric, termed “supplemental
jurisdiction.”7 The statute extends supplemental jurisdiction, in all joinder
contexts, to non-jurisdictional state law claims that “are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy” under Article III.8
The House Report accompanying the 1990 statute shows that the
drafters of the statute assumed that the “same case or controversy”
language of the statute would be interpreted in consonance with the
standard for pendent jurisdiction established by Gibbs.9 Gibbs itself
appeared to equate its “common nucleus of operative fact” standard for
pendent-claim jurisdiction with the scope of Article III. The Court stated:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists
whenever there is a claim “arising under [the] Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority . . . ,” and the
relationship between that claim and the state claim permits
the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional “case.” The federal claim
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if,
considered without regard to their federal or state character,
a plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power
in the federal courts to hear the whole.10

Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113–14
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
371–73 (1978), superceded by statute, § 310(a), 104 Stat. at 5113–14; Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976), superceded by statute § 310(a), 104 Stat. at 5113–14.
6. See infra note 115.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
8. See id. § 1367(a). The statute excludes certain exercises of supplemental jurisdiction
otherwise falling within this broad authorization in diversity cases. See id. § 1367(b).
9. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
10. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (alterations in original)
(citations and footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 2). The Court subsequently
restricted the principle of Gibbs in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), on the ground that
whatever justification the Court might have had for fashioning its own principles of pendent-claim
jurisdiction, it would not extend the same principle to exercises of pendent-party jurisdiction absent
express congressional authorization. Id. at 556. Although the Court characterized Gibbs in
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Nevertheless, Gibbs did not inherently present the constitutional issue
of how broadly statutory- or rules-based joinder provisions might reach to
encompass non-diverse state law claims within the same Article III “case”
or “controversy” as claims falling independently within federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Instead, Gibbs can be viewed as nothing more than an
interpretation of the statutes conferring original federal court jurisdiction
or a federal common-law decision defining the scope of supplemental
jurisdiction that federal courts may exercise absent explicit congressional
authorization.
The enactment of the 1990 supplemental-jurisdiction statute—in which
Congress expressly authorized the federal courts to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by Article III—directly posed the
previously unanswered question whether the Gibbs “common nucleus”
standard was indeed constitutionally based, or instead failed to exhaust the
full constitutional scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction over nondiverse state law claims joined with claims falling within the limited
categories of federal subject matter jurisdiction enumerated in Article III.
Put another way, the statute signaled the demise of Gibbs as the central
focus of supplemental-jurisdiction analysis and instead mandates direct
consideration of the requirements of the Constitution itself. Following the
statute’s enactment, however, the main areas of controversy did not focus
on this bedrock issue but rather on puzzling omissions and inconsistencies
that inhered in the statute’s exclusion of certain types of claims in diversity
actions.11 The Supreme Court recently resolved some of the statutory

constitutional terms, that conclusion was unnecessary to the Court’s decision and its rationale
provides inferential support for the view that Gibbs rested on a federal common-law foundation
rather than on the Constitution itself.
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005), the Court again
suggested that Gibbs was constitutionally based. Again, the suggestion was unnecessary to its
decision. See infra notes 181, 233.
11. Section 1367(b) of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute provides:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with
the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). For a spirited discussion regarding § 1367, see the following Emory Law
Journal articles containing an exchange between Professors Richard D. Freer and Thomas C.
Arthur, who criticize the statute, and Professors Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank, and
Thomas M. Mengler, who defend it: Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt
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ambiguities with its decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services,
Inc.12 Nonetheless many other issues remain unresolved, and neither
Allapattah nor any other decision of the Supreme Court has directly
addressed the constitutional issue just described.
In recent years, however, decisions in the courts of appeals and
renewed scholarly commentary have turned to the constitutional issue
arising from the enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.13 The
immediate occasion for this development has been the long-standing
question whether supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims
asserted under Rule 13(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure14 may
exist even though, by definition, those claims do not arise out of the “same
transaction or occurrence” as the plaintiff’s original claim. The longprevailing understanding—with some discordant notes—was that such
claims, because of the absence of a sufficient transactional relationship
with the plaintiff’s claim, fell outside the supplemental jurisdiction of the
court and required an independent basis for jurisdiction.15 An exception to
this general understanding was recognized where the permissive
counterclaims were asserted only defensively by way of set-off and not as
a basis for affirmative recovery.16 Despite this history, several recent

Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991)
[hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Straws]; Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close
Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn’t Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J.
1007 (1991); Freer, supra note 4; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas M.
Mengler, Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to
Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank & Thomas
M. Mengler, A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991).
12. 545 U.S. 546 (2005). In Allapattah, the Supreme Court concluded “that the threshold
requirement of § 1367(a) is satisfied in cases, like those now before us, where some, but not all, of
the plaintiffs in a diversity action allege a sufficient amount in controversy.” Id. at 566. The Court
further concluded that the plain language of § 1367(b) failed to exclude supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims by plaintiffs joined under Rules 20 or 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 565–66. Inconsistently, the Court concluded that the statute preserved the long-standing
complete-diversity requirement in that same context. See id. at 553–54.
13. See, e.g., Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2004)
(discussing supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs and § 1367); Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs.,
Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 385–86 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that § 1367 extends the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of Article III); William A. Fletcher, Commentary, “Common
Nucleus of Operative Fact” and Defensive Set-off: Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171 (1998)
(arguing that the Article III supplemental-jurisdiction test is broader than the Gibbs test).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) (“A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an
opposing party that is not compulsory.”). Under Rule 13(a), a counterclaim is compulsory if it
arises out of “the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
15. See infra notes 50–54, 61, 73–74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 54, 59, 72 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 55, 81–82 (noting
the questionable origins of the exception).
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decisions have concluded, in the wake of the supplemental-jurisdiction
statute, that the “same transaction” requirement of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is not determinative and have approved the assertion of
supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims.17
These decisions have relied in part on the views of various
commentators who, over the years, have suggested that the Gibbs
formulation has no constitutional foundation and that the scope of the
Article III “case” or “controversy” is as broad as Congress and the rules
drafters might choose to make it—so long as at least one claim in the
action falls within the scope of Article III.18 Although aware of this view,
the federal courts have yet to endorse it. Rather they have suggested, as an
intermediate position, that the “same transaction” standard for the joinder
of parties and claims that pervades the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure19
does not establish the limits of the constitutional case: the Constitution
requires only a “loose factual connection” between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims.20 Under this view, so long as a “loose factual
connection” exists, supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive
counterclaim that does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence
as the plaintiff’s main claim is proper under the 1990 statute, even if
affirmative relief is sought.
Contemporaneously with these developments, I have suggested yet
another view of supplemental jurisdiction that focuses neither on the
degree of transactional or factual relationship among claims per se nor on
the scope of the case as defined by the rules drafters or Congress. Rather,
in seeking the boundaries of Article III, I would ask whether the assertion
of federal jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims in the action
before the court is “necessary and proper” to permit the federal court to
resolve matters clearly falling within the scope of Article III.21
In a post-Gibbs world, therefore, three competing views of the
permissible scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction over non-diverse
state law claims have emerged. First, a “delegation” model, which reads
the Constitution to have delegated to Congress an apparently unrestricted
power to define the scope of an Article III case or controversy, provided

17. See infra notes 87–107 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) (permissive
counterclaims); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (cross-claims against a co-party); FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (thirdparty practice); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties).
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See generally Floyd, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 4; C. Douglas Floyd, The
Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55
EMORY L.J. 487 (2006) [hereinafter Floyd, Interstate Commerce]; C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits
of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (2004) [hereinafter Floyd, Minimal Diversity].
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at least one claim in the action falls within the scope of Article III. Second,
a “factual relationship” model, which seeks to give more precise content
to Gibbs’s “common nucleus of operative fact” standard and to distinguish
it from the “same transaction or occurrence” joinder standard of the
Federal Rules. And third, a “necessary and proper” model, which restrains
Congress’s ability to authorize the joinder of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims based, not on the nature of the factual or transactional
relationship among the claims to be joined, but rather on whether such
joinder is necessary and proper to achieve the purposes underlying the
enumerated heads of federal jurisdiction set out in Article III.
This Article addresses each of these theories in turn and concludes that
the first two approaches to the supplemental-jurisdiction question in a
world unencumbered by the Gibbs standard (to the extent that Gibbs is not
constitutionally based) are subject to serious objections and should be
rejected. Rather, the post-Gibbs contours of federal jurisdiction are
properly defined by referring to the purposes underlying the limited grants
of federal subject matter jurisdiction contained in Article III. In some
instances, such as permissive counterclaims, this model would permit their
assertion—even those seeking affirmative relief—absent any transactional
or factual relationship with the plaintiff’s main claims. In other instances,
it would reject supplemental jurisdiction even though a transactional or
factual relationship exists.
II. THE UNRESTRICTED RULES-BASED DELEGATION MODEL OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
A. Emerging Suggestions in the Literature
In an important article prescient of the constitutional issue now posed
by the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, Professor Matasar suggested in
1983 that the “fact relatedness” requirement apparently adopted by Gibbs
as the touchstone of supplemental jurisdiction is not constitutionally
based.22 Rather, the requirement was grounded in an interpretation of the
statute conferring original federal court jurisdiction, or in discretionary
considerations as a matter of federal common law.23 Matasar argued
instead for an extremely expansive definition of the “case” or
“controversy” under Article III of the Constitution as including all matters

22. Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and
the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1463 (1983).
23. Id. at 1491.
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authorized by “lawfully adopted procedural rules for joinder of claims and
parties.”24
Matasar’s reasoning in reaching this conclusion was complex, drawing
on several interrelated points. First, he parsed the language of the Gibbs
standard itself. Gibbs stated that the relationship between the federal and
state claims must “permit[] the conclusion that the entire action before the
court comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’”25 The Court continued:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if . . . a plaintiff’s claims are
such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the
federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the
whole.26
Matasar noted that the “common nucleus of operative fact” formulation of
Gibbs had no clear statutory or judicial antecedents and had been
interpreted in various ways by various courts.27 Reviewing the history of
supplemental jurisdiction before Gibbs, he noted that Gibbs’s purpose was
to expand the narrow interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction that had
prevailed under the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurn v. Oursler,28 which
required virtual “factual identity” among jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims to permit the fair and efficient adjudication of entire
controversies.29 In Matasar’s view, this history argued for broadly
interpreting the “common nucleus” standard in accordance with the
“transactional” joinder standard that pervades the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which most courts had in turn interpreted as requiring only a
“logical” or “loose” factual relationship among claims.30
Regarding Gibbs’s “enigmatic” additional statement that a plaintiff’s
claims must be such that he would “ordinarily be expected to try them all

24. Id. at 1407; see also id. at 1479 (“Supplemental jurisdiction, therefore, is constitutionally
permissible whenever the rules governing federal procedure permit the joinder in one action of
jurisdictionally insufficient nonfederal claims or parties with a jurisdictionally sufficient federal
claim.”); id. at 1491 (“Once ‘case’ is made coextensive with the lawfully created procedural limits
of joinder, the question of constitutional power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction becomes quite
simple—jurisdiction exists if joinder is permissible under valid procedural rules.”). Matasar also
argued that Gibbs’s requirement that the federal question be “substantial” to support the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction was not constitutionally based. Id. at 1417–46, 1453.
25. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
26. Id.
27. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1448–49.
28. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
29. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1449–53.
30. Id. at 1451–54.
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in one judicial proceeding,” Matasar noted that most courts had failed to
give the statement any independent significance beyond the “common
nucleus” requirement.31 Matasar suggested that the “ordinarily be expected
to try” formulation could be given a plausible independent reading as
encompassing those claims that litigants could expect to try together under
the procedural rules adopted by the Supreme Court and accepted by
Congress.32
Next, Matasar explored the uncertainty arising from the relationship
between the “common nucleus” and “ordinarily be expected to try”
requirements, assuming them to have independent significance.33 He noted
that the “but if” clause could be read either in the conjunctive, requiring
the satisfaction of both elements to permit the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction, or in the disjunctive, allowing the satisfaction of either
element to sustain the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.34 He found
difficulties with both interpretations. On either reading, depending on
whether they were broadly or narrowly interpreted, the requirements were
either redundant or internally contradictory.35 Ultimately, he concluded

31. Id. at 1454–56.
32. Id. at 1458.
33. Id. at 1458–63.
34. Id. at 1458–60.
35. Matasar first considered the disjunctive reading in which supplemental jurisdiction would
be properly exercised if either the “common nucleus” or the “ordinarily be expected to try”
requirement were satisfied. Id. at 1458–59. He found support for this approach in the plainlanguage meaning of the “but if” clause, which he interpreted to mean “unless.” Id. at 1458–60 &
n.281. If “ordinarily be expected to try” were equated with “permitted to be brought,” as courts
had done, then the “common nucleus” requirement would be rendered essentially superfluous
because “claims arising from a common factual basis will be tried together.” Id. at 1459.
Alternatively, as Professors Wright and Miller posited, “ordinarily be expected to try” could be
conflated with res judicata so that the phrase “refer[red] ‘to what res judicata would require if the
claims were all federally created or all state created.’” Id. at 1457 (quoting 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1367, at 445 (1st ed. 1975)). In this case,
the phrase would be subsumed by the “common nucleus” requirement because res judicata often
depends on a finding that the claims are “encompassed within the same cause of action” and
because, at the time Matasar wrote his article, the scope of res judicata “encompasse[d] a narrower
range of claims than a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’” Id. at 1459–60.
Turning to the interpretation that the “common nucleus” and “ordinarily be expected to try”
elements were conjunctive, Matasar initially noted that the “but if” language used by Gibbs could
be interpreted to mean “and” only through the use of “verbal acrobatics of the highest order.” Id.
at 1460. Moreover, if “ordinarily be expected to try” meant “permitted to be brought,” then it would
always be satisfied by the “common nucleus” requirement and thus would be superfluous. Id.
Returning to the suggestion that “ordinarily be expected to try” was tied to res judicata, Matasar
pointed out that the standard conception of res judicata was that a prior decision had effect only on
those subsequent claims that were part of the same cause of action, and at the time, this conception
was more restrictive than the “common nucleus” formulation. Id. Consequently, as long as courts
relied upon the cause of action to define the bounds of res judicata, tying supplemental jurisdiction
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that the requirements could be reconciled only if both were not
constitutionally based. Rather, in his view, the second, “ordinarily be
expected to try” requirement (as defined by validly adopted rules of
procedure) prescribed the dimensions of the constitutional “case” or
“controversy,” and the first, “common nucleus” formulation represented
a “subsidiary statutory barrier” to the joinder of claims.36
Matasar drew support for the conclusion that the “fact relatedness”
requirement of Gibbs was not of constitutional dimension by noting six
contexts in which the federal courts had upheld the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction despite the absence of such a factual relationship
among jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims.37 These contexts
included conflicting claims to property before the court, federal
receivership proceedings, aggregation of claims to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount in diversity cases, bankruptcy proceedings, jurisdiction over
unrelated claims for set-off, and factually unrelated attorney’s fees
disputes in cases properly before the court.38
Finally, Matasar drew support for his broad, rules-based definition of
the constitutional case from language in Chief Justice Marshall’s
expansive definition of federal-question jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States.39 Arguing that a case “arises under” federal law
whenever an “original ingredient” of the plaintiff’s case involves a federal
question, even if that question is not contested in the case at bar, Marshall
stated that a court exercising Article III judicial power is:

to res judicata would have the effect of returning to the Hurn test abandoned in Gibbs. See id. at
1460–61.
After rejecting both the conjunctive and the disjunctive readings of Gibbs, Matasar then
described how courts had actually interpreted the Gibbs language. He identified two main
approaches: courts either (1) ignored the problem or (2) failed to give the “ordinarily be expected
to try” language independent significance. Id. at 1462. Both approaches could be explained by the
argument that the “ordinarily be expected to try” language served merely as an example of the
“common nucleus” requirement. Ultimately, Matasar reasoned that—as long as both phrases were
given constitutional significance—it would be impossible to conclude whether the conjunctive or
disjunctive interpretation is the proper one. See id. at 1461–62.
If, on the other hand, the two phrases were drawn from different sources, Matasar proposed a
two-step approach that could be used to reconcile them. Id. at 1462–63. According to Matasar, the
predominant view at the time was that the “ordinarily be expected to try” requirement was broader
than the “common nucleus” requirement. Id. at 1463. Under this view, the “ordinarily be expected
to try” requirement could be read to define the constitutional threshold of supplemental jurisdiction,
while the “common nucleus” requirement denotes a “subsidiary statutory barrier to joinder of
claims.” Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1463–77.
38. Id.
39. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
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“capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it, by
a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.
It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares, that the
judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . arising under the
constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.”40
Matasar drew further support from the broad power historically exercised
by Congress and its delegates to prescribe and modify federal rules of
procedure to resolve controversies in light of evolving notions of fairness
and efficiency.41 “Congress’ delegation of this broad-ranging rulemaking
authority to the Court should in itself demonstrate the inherent
expandability of a constitutional ‘case,’ a concept which should be keyed
to a dynamic system of procedural rules.”42
Thirty years before Matasar, Professor Green foreshadowed Matasar’s
conclusions in the context of the specific example of the permissive
counterclaim. Green concluded, contrary to prevailing doctrine, that “a
federal district court having jurisdiction over an action has the power to try
all counterclaims filed in the action.”43 Without specifically addressing the
parameters of Article III, he argued, as a historic matter, that both the
plaintiff’s original claim and a defendant’s counterclaim were “parts of a
single action.”44 Further, Green argued that “the idea of disposing of the
claims of plaintiff and defendant in one suit and giving affirmative relief
to whichever party was entitled thereto was not unknown to the Congress
which passed the first Judiciary Act,” citing statutes to that effect in three
of the colonies.45 Green found strong policy reasons for favoring the
comprehensive disposition of all disputes between the parties in one
action, rather than inefficient piecemeal litigation.46 Regarding the Article
III problem, Green asserted that jurisdiction over the action was
determined by the allegations of the complaint: “Since a counterclaim is
not a new action but a continuation of the action begun by the plaintiff’s
complaint, the district court should be able to entertain a counterclaim
even though it has no independent grounds of jurisdiction.”47 Relying on
a historic, rules-based view of the Article III case, Green argued that “the
framers of the Constitution did not use ‘case’ in a metaphorical sense but

40. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1479–80 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819).
41. Id. at 1480–87.
42. Id. at 1484.
43. Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 NW. U. L. REV. 271,
272 (1953).
44. Id. at 273.
45. Id. at 274 (noting that statutes existed in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey).
46. Id. at 271–72.
47. Id. at 275–76.
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were speaking of the unit of litigation that the law of procedure, in the
normal course of events, allows to be disposed of at one trial.”48
Green recognized that both precedent and scholarly analysis conflicted
with his position.49 Although the Supreme Court in Moore v. New York
Cotton Exchange50 had upheld ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims arising from the same transaction as plaintiff’s main claim,51
lower courts had generally required an independent basis for jurisdiction
over unrelated permissive counterclaims.52 In Green’s view, however,
these decisions were poorly reasoned and unpersuasive.53 In his leading
treatise, Professor Moore also concluded that ancillary jurisdiction did not
extend to permissive counterclaims but recognized that permissive
counterclaims asserted only by way of defensive set-off and not as a basis
for affirmative recovery could be entertained.54 In Green’s view, however,
Moore provided no satisfactory basis for concluding that all permissive
counterclaims were not part of the plaintiff’s main action.55 Further, the
distinction was impractical because it would not be possible to know
whether the counterclaim was to be used only defensively or as a basis for
affirmative recovery until after the action was tried and the amount of
plaintiff’s judgment and defendant’s recovery were known.56 At this point,
after trial, it would make no sense to hold that the court could enter

48. Id. at 293.
49. See id. at 271.
50. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
51. Id. at 609.
52. Green, supra note 43, at 283–85.
53. Id. at 285 (“Not a single well reasoned case has held that a counterclaim should be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction when the court had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim.”).
54. Id. at 287 (citing 3 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL P RACTICE § 54 (2d ed.
1948)).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 287–88. Green specifically stated:
If the court has jurisdiction of the counterclaim used defensively it will hear
evidence on that along with the other defenses, if any, and may have received a
verdict or reached a decision on the merits before it becomes apparent that the
counterclaim will result in an affirmative judgment for the defendant.
Id. at 288. This point is undercut, to some extent, by the settled rule (acknowledged by Green, see
id. at 289) that claims by way of defensive set-off were proper only if they were liquidated or
capable of liquidation, making the amount claimed by the defendant apparent at the outset. See 3
JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.31 (3d ed. rev. vol. 2002) (“Claims for
defensive setoff for a liquidated or otherwise ascertained amount pleaded solely to diminish or
reduce a judgment for the opposing party provide an exception to the rule that permissive
counterclaims require an independent basis for jurisdiction.”); see also D’Agostino Excavators, Inc.
v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1081 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970).
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judgment recognizing the set-off but precluding affirmative recovery
based on the same facts.57
More recently, Professor Fletcher returned to the example of federal
jurisdiction over an unrelated claim for set-off “to argue that the
constitutional test for supplemental jurisdiction is broader than the
‘common nucleus of operative fact’ test of United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs.”58 Fletcher noted that American courts had followed English
practice in allowing claims for defensive set-off even when the claims
arose from facts unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim.59 He observed that the
“utility and essential fairness of defensive set-off is clear” because, absent
its availability, a plaintiff could obtain a procedural advantage by
enforcing a monetary judgment without deducting an existing liquidated
debt or judgment owed to the defendant, eliminating the defendant’s most
effective security for payment of its claim.60 Fletcher noted that the
historic treatment of defensive set-offs was in tension with the general pre1990 requirement that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction over claims for
which there was no independent basis for federal subject matter
jurisdiction required the existence of a transactional—or, after Gibbs,
“common nucleus of operative fact”—relationship with a claim or claims
for which there was an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.61 This
tension had led two federal courts of appeals to hold or suggest that the
defensive set-off was improper to the extent it permitted the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over factually unrelated claims.62 However, in
Fletcher’s view, these decisions were wrong, both because it was not clear
that the Supreme Court would apply the Gibbs test to all types of
supplemental jurisdiction and because doing so would be “almost certainly
wrong as a matter of historical constitutional interpretation.”63 He argued
that the Framers did not intend to confine Article III “cases” and

57. Green, supra note 43, at 288 (“Yet in sustaining the defense [by way of set-off] the court
has taken jurisdiction of the counterclaim, has tried the issues of law and fact, and has arrived at
a decision. All of these steps are said to be within its power, but the rendering of an affirmative
judgment for the defendant is said to be beyond its power. These writers seem to be attempting to
define federal jurisdiction by the use of outmoded procedural doctrines which have no necessary
connection with the division of power between the state and federal governments.”).
58. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 171.
59. Id. at 172.
60. Id. (“The rationale supporting defensive set-off is strongest in a suit by an insolvent
where a defendant might not be able to recover any of the debt owed to him by a plaintiff, but it
extends to all cases where it would be more difficult, uncertain, or expensive for a defendant to
recover from a plaintiff without the assistance of set-off.”).
61. Id. at 171–72.
62. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir. 1996);
Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1984).
63. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 177.
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“controversies” to transactionally related claims. Instead, “civil cases and
controversies in the then-contemporary practice could involve adjudication
of claims arising out of unrelated facts, both in English and American
courts, as they did in entertaining unrelated counterclaims for defensive
set-off beginning in the early 1700s.”64 Thus, defensive set-off should not
be viewed as an “exception to a general constitutional rule, for there is no
such—or at least should be no such—general rule.”65
Fletcher also argued that abandoning the Gibbs formulation for all
types of supplemental jurisdiction would not lead to unlimited expansions
of federal jurisdiction with “no stopping place.”66 Rather,
It would be a comprehensible constitutional test to allow
supplemental jurisdiction to extend no further than to
whatever could have been tried in a single judicial proceeding
at the time of the Constitution’s adoption. Such a test would
allow supplemental jurisdiction over defensive set-off claims
arising out of unrelated facts, but it would limit the federal
courts to joinder devices available at the time of the
Constitution’s framing.67
But, if this historic test were too confining, “a broader constitutional test
could permit supplemental jurisdiction over whatever can be tried as part
of a single judicial proceeding under modern joinder rules.”68 In this latter
suggestion, Fletcher echoed the views of Matasar and others that the scope
of the Article III case is as broad as Congress or the rules drafters may
choose.
As developed below, I agree with these commentators that the scope
of federal supplemental jurisdiction should not be defined solely with
reference to the existence of some transactional or factual relationship
among jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims. I also agree that
supplemental jurisdiction should be recognized over permissive
counterclaims, whether by way of set-off or as a basis for affirmative
recovery. But the argument that there are and should be no boundaries on
the ability of the rules drafters to define the scope of the federal
constitutional case goes much too far. That approach would threaten the
careful allocation of judicial power between federal and state governments

64. Id.
65. Id. at 178. As discussed below, this history provides an inadequate basis for defining the
limits of an “arising under” or diversity “case” or “controversy” jurisdiction under Article III. See
infra notes 123–38 and accompanying text.
66. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 178.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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prescribed by the Constitution. Additionally, the suggestion that historic
joinder practice provides a pertinent “stopping place” is misplaced,
because that practice was not addressed to the proper division of authority
between the courts of different sovereigns, and in any event, imposed
serious constraints on the joinder of claims both within and across
jurisdictional lines.69
B. Echoes in the Cases: The Problem of the Permissive
Counterclaim
In 1970, Professor Green’s views on the existence of federal
jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims received a distinguished
endorsement in Judge Henry Friendly’s concurrence in D’Agostino
Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co.70 In D’Agostino, an excavation
subcontractor sued the prime contractor for payments on a government
contract governed by the Miller Act.71 The prime contractor
counterclaimed for overpayments and extra costs on both the government
contract and a separate private contract on another job. Upholding
ancillary jurisdiction over the counterclaim on the private contract for
which there was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Second
Circuit majority applied the general rule that ancillary jurisdiction exists
over compulsory but not permissive counterclaims, unless they are
asserted only by way of set-off.72 The court then found that the defendant’s
counterclaim on the private contract was compulsory because it arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s Miller Act claim on
the government contract (as required by Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).73 In so doing, the court applied the very liberal
“logical relationship” test that prevails in the courts of appeals for
determining whether the “same transaction” standard has been satisfied.
The court concluded that the test was satisfied because both contracts were
entered into by the same parties regarding the same type of work carried
on during the same period and because the defendant had the right to
terminate or withhold payments on either contract in the event of breach
or damages suffered on the other.74 Additionally, progress payments were
not allocated between the jobs, a single insurance policy covered both, and
the claimed breaches related to both projects. Thus, “[t]he controversy

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See infra notes 123–38 and accompanying text.
430 F.2d 1077, 1087–88 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080–81.
See id. at 1081–82; FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
D’Agostino, 430 F.2d at 1081–82.
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between the parties which gave rise to this litigation was with respect to
both jobs and arose from occurrences affecting both.”75
In his concurrence, Judge Friendly found these facts to be “lacking in
legal significance” and concluded that claims under the private and
government contracts did not arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence.76 Nevertheless, he would have upheld ancillary jurisdiction
over both counterclaims on the grounds previously advocated by Green,
noting that Professor Moore’s exception for set-offs “carries the seeds of
destruction of the supposed general rule.”77
Despite their eminent pedigrees, the suggestions of Professor Green
and Judge Friendly bore little fruit until the enactment of the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute in 1990. The statute caused Professor
Fletcher to revisit the topic his article previously reviewed.78 Similarly,
several courts of appeals have reconsidered the issue in light of the 1990
statute and adopted the rule that, at least in some cases, a permissive
counterclaim may fall within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
The Third Circuit questioned the conventional wisdom even before the
enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute. In Abromovage v.
United Mine Workers79—an action by union health and welfare trustees
alleging that the union was liable for failing to collect required
contributions from employers—the court considered whether
counterclaims by the union for set-off of unpaid loans fell within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.80 The Third Circuit
assumed for the purpose of argument that the counterclaims were
permissive but declined to invoke Professor Moore’s “set-off” exception
to the general rule that permissive counterclaims require an independent
jurisdictional basis.81 The court noted that “[t]he origins of this exception
are not totally clear” and that Moore had advanced it “without any
supporting cases.”82 Rather, the court upheld ancillary jurisdiction over the
presumptively permissive counterclaim on the ground that the “same
transaction” standard for compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not coextensive with the
constitutional standard defining the limits on federal jurisdiction imposed

75.
76.
77.
§ 13.19).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1087–89 (Friendly, J., concurring).
Id. at 1088 (citing Green, supra note 43, at 277–81, and 3 MOORE, supra note 54,
See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text.
726 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 974, 988.
Id. at 988–89 & nn.45–47.
Id. at 988 n.47 (citing the first edition of Moore’s Federal Practice).
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by Article III.83 To satisfy the constitutional standard, as prescribed in
Gibbs, the counterclaim must arise out of a “common nucleus of operative
fact” with the plaintiff’s main claim, and a counterclaim might meet this
requirement even if the Rule 13(a) “same transaction” standard were not
satisfied.84 “[S]everal transactions may share an intersection of ‘operative
facts,’ and commentators have recognized that the two tests . . . need not
map the same landscape.”85 Thus even assuming that the union’s
counterclaims were permissive, the claims arose out of the same common
nucleus of operative fact as the trustees’ main claims because they “grew
out of the relationship between the Union and the Fund, which is the
subject matter of appellants’ claims”; their resolution implicated “the
entire factual matrix” that was before the court; and the “critical
background issues with respect to liability” were the same.86
In Channell v. Citicorp National Services, Inc.,87 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute altered
the permissive counterclaim rule.88 The issue was whether supplemental
jurisdiction existed over the defendant’s counterclaims for earlytermination charges under automobile leases asserted in a class action
alleging that the defendant had violated the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA)
by failing to adequately disclose its method of calculating the charges.89
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion assumed that the counterclaims were
permissive but nonetheless held that, after the enactment of the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute, the claims were part of the same case or
controversy as the federal CLA claims. That was because the statute
authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction “to the limits of
Article III—which means that ‘[a] loose factual connection between the
claims’ can be enough.”90 In Channell, that “loose” standard was satisfied
because the CLA claims were based on the same lease—indeed, the same
clause in the lease—as the defendant’s state law counterclaims for unpaid
termination charges.91 The court did not elaborate on why it believed that
a “loose factual connection” that was not sufficient to satisfy the “same
83. Id. at 989–90.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 990.
86. Id. at 991–92.
87. 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 385.
89. Id. at 380.
90. Id. at 385 (quoting Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir.
1995)).
91. Id. at 385–86. The court explained: “The acts creating the claims differ—the claims
against Citicorp stem from the signing of the lease, while the claims against the class stem from the
early termination of the lease. But the parties, the lease, the clause, and even the terminations are
constants . . . .” Id.
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transaction or occurrence” standard of the compulsory-counterclaim rule
nonetheless satisfied Article III’s same “case or controversy” requirement,
other than by an unexplained citation to two previous decisions that were
not on point.92
In the most thorough consideration of the issue to date, a Second
Circuit panel, in Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,93 applied the “loose
factual connection” standard to sustain supplemental jurisdiction over a
defendant’s state law counterclaims for amounts due on loans to certain
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had violated the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) through practices that effectively imposed
higher interest rates on the basis of race on African-American customers
who had purchased Ford vehicles.94 The district court dismissed the
counterclaims because they were permissive and therefore, under the
traditional rule, did not fall within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.95
The Second Circuit agreed that the counterclaims were permissive but
nonetheless sustained supplemental jurisdiction over them.96
The Second Circuit first upheld the district court’s conclusion that the
counterclaims were permissive rather than compulsory.97 The ECOA
claims turned on Ford’s mark-up policy, which was based on subjective
factors that allegedly resulted in the imposition of higher rates for
plaintiffs on racial grounds. The counterclaims were related to the same
purchase contracts but to non-payment rather than to the rates that were
charged. “Thus, the relationship between the counterclaims and the ECOA
claim is ‘logical’ only in the sense that the sale, allegedly on

92. See id. The cases cited were Baer, 72 F.3d at 1294, and Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423
(7th Cir. 1995). Ammerman derived the “loose factual relationship” standard from a statement in
a leading treatise, but that portion of the treatise does not address the content of that standard, its
possible relation to the “same transaction or occurrence” joinder standard that pervades the Federal
Rules, or the long-standing compulsory–permissive counterclaim distinction. Ammerman, 54 F.3d
at 424 (citing 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3567.1, at 117 & n.9). The factual relationship
between the Title VII sexual-harassment claim and the state assault claim in that case was close,
not loose. The circumstances in Baer are even less on point. There, a district court’s order of
dismissal of a Title VII action resolved a fee dispute between co-counsel with respect to settlement
funds held by the clerk of the court. Baer, 72 F.3d at 1296. Supplemental jurisdiction therefore
existed, not based on a factual relationship among claims, but to enforce the orders of the court with
respect to matters within its jurisdiction. See id. at 1300–01; infra Part IV.D.4; see also Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380–81 (1994).
93. 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
94. Ford Motor Credit asserted counterclaims for unpaid loan balances against three of the
four named plaintiffs and conditional counterclaims against members of the putative class that the
three represented. Id. at 207.
95. Id. at 208.
96. Id. at 209, 213–14.
97. Id. at 209.
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discriminatory credit terms, was the ‘but for’ cause of the non-payment.”98
The facts necessary to prove the claims and counterclaims were “not so
closely related that resolving both sets of issues in one lawsuit would yield
judicial efficiency.”99
The court then traced the history of the requirement for independent
jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims recounted above and concluded
that the case law did not explain “why independent jurisdiction should be
needed for permissive counterclaims.”100 The court observed that one
possible reason was to avoid opening the federal courts to “every
conceivable non-compulsory counterclaim that a defendant might happen
to have against a plaintiff, some of which might be totally inappropriate
for federal jurisdiction.”101 Recounting the objections of Professor Green
and Judge Friendly to the traditional rule, the court noted that with the
enactment of § 1367, the previous common-law rule no longer controlled.
Congress explicitly authorized the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction to
the full extent permitted by Article III’s “case” or “controversy”
limitation.102 The court noted with approval Judge Easterbrook’s
conclusion in Channell that the Gibbs “common nucleus of operative fact”
formulation of the scope of the Article III “case” required only that the
claims have a “loose factual connection” and not that they arise out of the
“same transaction or occurrence” as required by the compulsory
counterclaim rule.103 The claims and counterclaims before the court were
“loosely connected” because all of the claims originated “from the
Plaintiffs’ decisions to purchase Ford cars.”104 Thus, “[t]he counterclaims
and the underlying claim bear a sufficient factual relationship (if one is
necessary) to constitute the same ‘case’ within the meaning of Article III
and hence of section 1367.”105 In a footnote, the court explained that the
outer bounds of the constitutional case might be even broader, noting the
views of Matasar and others (discussed above) that would confer

98. Id.
99. Id. at 210.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 211. The court argued, for example, that a wife’s federal action against her husband
seeking to establish rights as a joint author should not be a vehicle for a counterclaim for divorce.
Id. Of course, the “domestic relations” exception to federal jurisdiction would exclude the
hypothetical counterclaim in any event. See generally 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3609,
at 459 (noting that, despite the diversity statute’s broad language, federal courts have refused to
adjudicate domestic disputes even between diverse parties).
102. Jones, 358 F.3d at 211–12 (citing Green, supra note 43, at 283, and United States v.
Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring)).
103. Id. at 213 (citing Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 385–86 (7th Cir.
1996)).
104. Id. at 214.
105. Id. at 213–14 (emphasis added).
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apparently unchecked discretion on Congress and the rules drafters to
fashion whatever rules for joinder of parties and claims they might wish,
even to the extent of dispensing with any factual relationship between the
claims.106 Finally, the court implied that a more lax constitutional standard
might apply to counterclaims asserted by defendants than to claims joined
by plaintiffs because “[a] plaintiff might be tempted to file an insubstantial
federal law claim as an excuse to tie to it one or more state law claims that
do not belong in a federal court.”107
Thus, in the Ford Motor lexicon, three distinct types of relationships
among claims exist for the purpose of resolving issues of joinder and
supplemental jurisdiction: (1) claims that arise out of the “same transaction
or occurrence” because they have a “logical relationship,” (2) claims that
fail to satisfy that standard but nonetheless have a “loose factual
connection,” and (3) claims that have no factual relationship at all.
According to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the scope of the Article III
case extends to the second category. According to the Second Circuit, it
may extend to the third.
C. Objections to the Rules-Based Delegation Model
In effect, the concept that an Article III case encompasses all claims
and parties the joinder of which is authorized by validly adopted statutes
or rules of procedure delegates the definition of the constitutional case to
Congress or the drafters of the rules. Such an unrestricted rules-based
model of federal jurisdiction raises a host of questions and objections to
which its proponents have failed to provide satisfactory answers. Most
significantly, this model would authorize Congress and the rules drafters
to transfer to federal court potentially unlimited numbers of non-diverse
state law claims lying at the core of the historic jurisdiction of state courts.
That transfer would be unfettered by any guiding or limiting principle and
would lack any grounding, either in the purposes of the strictly enumerated
grants of federal jurisdiction set out in Article III or in the ability of the
federal courts efficiently and fairly to resolve Article III cases.108
Of course, the most recent invocation of a rules-based delegation model
by Professor Fletcher was advanced in the limited context of arguing that
supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims should be upheld
even if the claims do not arise from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s
main claim.109 As discussed below, supplemental jurisdiction over such
106. Id. at 213 n.5.
107. Id. at 214 n.7.
108. See generally Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 635–37; Floyd, Supplemental
Jurisdiction, supra note 4.
109. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 176–79.
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permissive counterclaims—even when asserted as a basis for affirmative
recovery rather than only as a set-off against the plaintiff’s main
claim—should be upheld.110 However, it is not necessary to resort to a
model of federal jurisdiction that imposes essentially no limits on the
definition of the Article III “case” to reach that result. Rather, this result
may be grounded in the purposes of Article III, coupled with the principle
that an Article III “case” or “controversy” extends to permit the resolution
of non-diverse state law claims that, if resolved in a separate proceeding,
might result in unfairness to a party by or against whom a claim falling
within Article III was properly asserted in federal court.
Moreover, the genesis of the rules-based delegation model—which
defines an Article III case or controversy as broadly as whatever
provisions for joinder of parties and claims that the rules drafters might
adopt, so long as one of those claims lies within the enumerated categories
of Article III—is in no way confined to the narrow context of permissive
counterclaims.111 Rather, that model threatens to vastly expand federal
jurisdiction at the expense of the states—sometimes in startling
ways—without any grounding either in the text or purposes of Article III.
Consider, for example, the existing joinder provision of Rule 18 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule authorizes any party who has
properly asserted a claim falling within Article III in federal court to join
with it any other claim that party may possess against the opposing party,
regardless of whether it bears any legal or factual relationship with the
jurisdiction-conferring claim.112 On its face, this joinder provision would
permit a party possessing one federal-question claim against an opposing
party to join an unlimited number of legally and factually unrelated nondiverse state law claims, subject only to the district court’s discretion to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. Under long established practice, this broad
authorization in Rule 18 is constrained by the principle that the Federal
Rules themselves cannot create federal jurisdiction where none otherwise
110. See infra Part IV.D.2.
111. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 13, at 177 (arguing that limiting the definition of a “case”
to transactionally related claims would not be consistent with current usage because current
procedural rules allow joinder of non-transactionally related claims pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 13(b) (permissive counterclaim), 14 (third-party defendant claims against third-party plaintiff),
and 18(a) (allowing joinder of unrelated claims)); see also Matasar, supra note 22, at 1478–79
(“‘Case’ or ‘controversy’ as used in article III refers to the limits of joinder of claims and parties
set by the system of rules lawfully adopted to govern procedure in the federal courts. Supplemental
jurisdiction, therefore, is constitutionally permissible whenever the rules governing federal
procedure permit the joinder in one action of jurisdictionally insufficient nonfederal claims or
parties with a jurisdictionally sufficient federal claim.”).
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (“A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or thirdparty claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an
opposing party.”).
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would exist.113 Thus, under existing law, in addition to satisfying the nondemanding requirements of Rule 18, such joinder is permitted only if the
“common nucleus of operative fact” standard of Gibbs is also satisfied.114
In practice, this requirement has been equated with the “same transaction”
joinder standard that pervades the Federal Rules in other contexts—most
prominently, in the context of permissive joinder of parties under Rule
20.115 That standard, in turn, has been loosely interpreted to require only
that there be a “logical relationship” among claims to support their joinder
and the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.116 Where such a relationship
exists, both the joinder of claims and the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction can be argued to achieve judicial economy and to fulfill the
purposes of Article III.117
If a rules-based delegation model of the Article III case were adopted,
however, the inevitable conclusion would be that by adopting the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute, Congress radically revised this wellsettled jurisdictional landscape and vastly expanded the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts at the expense of the states—albeit
without intending to do so. The plain text of the supplemental-jurisdiction

113. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3141, at 484 (1997) (“The principle is that [the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are not to be construed as either extending or limiting the
jurisdiction of the federal courts or the venue of actions in those courts.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
82.
114. See 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1588, at 540 (1990) (“In light of the Gibbs
decision . . . a two-step approach is necessary to persuade a district court to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over a state claim joined under Rule 18(a) that does not meet federal subject-matter
jurisdiction requirements. First, the court must be convinced that it has judicial ‘power’ to exercise
pendent jurisdiction in a particular case; second, once judicial ‘power’ over the nonfederal claim
is acknowledged, the court must be encouraged to exercise its discretion to hear the claim by a
demonstration that doing so would further the policy objectives underlying the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).
115. See 3 MOORE, supra note 56, § 14.41[3] (“Through the years, the courts came to equate
this ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ [standard of supplemental jurisdiction] with ‘same
transaction or occurrence,’ a phrase that is employed in many of the joinder provisions of the
Federal Rules.”); see also id. § 14.41[4][a] (“The supplemental jurisdiction statute grants
supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the underlying
dispute. The relevant test for whether the claims are sufficiently related is whether the claim over
which supplemental jurisdiction is sought shares a common nucleus of operative fact with the
underlying claim. Stated another way, there is supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that arise
from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Professor
Moore’s treatise cites a number of cases demonstrating the confluence of the “common nucleus”
test with the “same transaction or occurrence” test, including Ambromovage v. United Mine
Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 1984), and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Spartan Mech.
Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664, 668–70 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 3 MOORE, supra note 56, § 14.41[3] n.11.
116. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 164–68 and
accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 163–68 and accompanying text.
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statute expands the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in federal-question
cases to include “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original [federal] jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution[,
including] claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.”118 If the scope of the constitutional case were to extend to any
claims that the Federal Rules authorize to be joined in the same action, as
the rules-based delegation model asserts, then Article III would encompass
all claims whose joinder is authorized by Rule 18, whether or not the
claims bore the slightest relationship with any claim independently falling
within the scope of Article III.119
Congress did not intend this dramatic expansion of federal jurisdiction
when it enacted the supplemental-jurisdiction statute. The legislative
history of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute shows that Congress’s
primary objective was to overrule the Supreme Court’s restrictive decision
in Finley v. United States,120 which rejected “pendent party” jurisdiction
over a party joined in a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action against the
United States.121 The Court denied jurisdiction because express
congressional authorization for the exercise of such jurisdiction was
lacking, despite the existence of a transactional relationship among the
claims and despite the fact that all of these factually interrelated claims
could be asserted only in a federal court because federal jurisdiction over
the FTCA claim was exclusive.122 Far from repudiating the “common
nucleus of operative fact” standard for the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction derived from Gibbs, the supplemental-jurisdiction statute’s
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to codify the Gibbs
standard.123 Surely if Congress had intended the dramatic revision of

118. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
119. But see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (reaffirming “the inability of a
court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute”). See generally Stephen
B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1029–30 n.60, 1172–73 n.673
(1982) (noting judicially recognized conflicts between the rules and pre-1934 jurisdictional limits).
Under the rules-based delegation model, however, § 1367(a) would, in effect, abrogate this longstanding principle without any specific reference in either the statute or its legislative history.
120. 490 U.S. 545 (1989), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113–14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)).
121. Id. at 555–56.
122. Id. at 549–54.
123. On April 2, 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee published a report recommending
“that Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same
‘transaction or occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction.” FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 47 (1990).
Following the April 2 Report, the Federal Courts Study Committee published a number of
Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports on June 1, 1990. These Working Papers cited Gibbs’s
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existing and well-settled jurisdictional principles that the rules-based
delegation model implies, some mention of that radical departure from
existing practice would have appeared in the legislative history of the
Judicial Improvements Act. Quite to the contrary, the Act was presented
as a modest revision to existing practice, and no mention of any dramatic
expansion of federal jurisdiction under Rule 18 appears. Nevertheless, the
text of the statute is clear: It extends the scope of supplemental jurisdiction
to the fullest extent permitted by Article III. If the rules-based delegation
model of federal supplemental jurisdiction were the correct interpretation
of Article III, an assertedly more restrictive but unexpressed congressional
intent underlying the statute would be immaterial.124 Moreover, although
apparently endorsing Gibbs, the legislative history of the statute suggests

“common nucleus of operative fact” language and summarized Gibbs as holding that “[s]eparate
claims are part of the same ‘case’ and may be heard together if they are based on related facts.
However, pendent jurisdiction is not mandatory.” 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS
AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 548 (1990) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966)). The recommendation of the Working Papers noted that the “common nucleus” test
was typically interpreted by courts to “require only that the claims arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence.” Id. at 560. Ultimately, the Working Papers recommended that “Congress codify this
case law by authorizing federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same ‘transaction or
occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims that require the joinder of
additional parties.” Id. It is clear, therefore, that the Working Papers recommended codification of
Gibbs’s supplemental-jurisdiction standard, as it had been interpreted and applied by most federal
courts at the time. See id. at 559–60.
The House Report accompanying Public Law 101-650, known as the Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, stated that the supplemental-jurisdiction provision of the Judicial Improvements Act
was intended to implement the Federal Courts Study Committee’s April 2, 1990, recommendation.
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6873. Later in the
House Report, the supplemental-jurisdiction statute is described as “authoriz[ing] the district court
to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental claim whenever it forms part of the same constitutional
case or controversy as the claim or claims that provide the basis of the district court’s original
jurisdiction.” Id. at 28–29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874–75. The footnote to this
statement of the Report states that “[i]n so doing, [this subsection] codifies the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court in [Gibbs].” Id. at 29 n.15,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6878 n.15.
Clearly, the supplemental-jurisdiction statute was intended to codify Gibbs supplementaljurisdiction standard. However, it is unclear what Congress thought the Gibbs standard meant.
Although the House Report directly cited the portion of the Federal Courts Study Committee Report
that employed the “same transaction or occurrence” terminology, the House Report itself did not
use that language. Instead, the Report broadly referred to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over claims that form part of the “same constitutional case or controversy” as the jurisdictionconferring claim. As discussed below, the legislative history of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute
provides support for multiple interpretations of this language. See infra note 125 and accompanying
text.
124. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566–68 (2005)
(finding that § 1367 is unambiguous and that an “authoritative statement [about a statute] is the
statutory text [itself], not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material”).
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multiple possible and conflicting interpretations of the Gibbs standard
itself.125
Although not rejecting a rules-based model of federal jurisdiction,
Professor Fletcher’s article on set-offs recognizes the model’s broad and
potentially troubling implications.126 Perhaps with this in mind, he
suggested that a logical stopping point might be found by defining the
scope of the constitutional case, not by referring to some kind of loose
factual relationship among jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims, but
rather by referring to the scope of claim and party joinder recognized in
England and the United States contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Constitution.127 He thus suggested, as an alternative, a “historical” rather
than transactional or fact-based model of federal jurisdiction.
In an earlier article, I concluded that Fletcher’s thesis provides an
inadequate principle for defining and limiting the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts with respect to non-diverse state law
claims joined in the same action with those enumerated by Article III.128
Fletcher’s approach is inadequate for several reasons. First, to the extent
that it refers to the joinder rules applicable to claims at law or in equity

125. An early draft of the statute submitted to Representative Kastenmeier—the Chair of the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
on the Judiciary—by professors at the Western New England College School of Law proposed two
alternatives for what ultimately became § 1367(a): one requiring that the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims arise out of the “same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences,” and the other requiring only that they be “so related that they constitute one case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III.” Fed. Courts Study Comm. Implementation Act and
Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 686–87 (1990). The authors clearly assumed that the second alternative was broader than the
first. See id. at 692. In particular, they defined a “case” or “controversy” to include claims that “(A)
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences[,] or (B)
would ordinarily be tried together in one judicial proceeding.” Id. at 687–88, 692 (emphasis added).
Later, however, they withdrew the second alternative, but it was reinstated in lieu of the same
transaction standard without explanation in a draft subsequently prepared by Professors Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank, and Thomas M. Mengler. Id. at 722. That draft was the basis
for the House Committee Report, which assumed that it incorporated the Gibbs standard. See supra
note 123 and accompanying text. This sequence of events is susceptible to the interpretation that
either the statute incorporated a “same transaction” standard for supplemental jurisdiction or that
it incorporated a broader standard extending beyond claims that are transactionally related.
126. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 179 (“[F]ew people will object on grounds of policy to
defensive set-off. The hard part is that many other transactionally unrelated claims may also be
within the constitutionally permissible supplemental jurisdiction. If that extends supplemental
jurisdiction too far, there is of course a solution—Congress may amend the statute.”).
127. Id. at 177–78 (“It would be a comprehensible constitutional test to allow supplemental
jurisdiction to extend no further than to whatever could have been tried in a single judicial
proceeding at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.”).
128. Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 637–42.
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when the Constitution was adopted, the approach does not provide an apt
analogy because rules applicable to joinder of claims and parties
admittedly falling within the subject matter jurisdiction of a single system
of courts are not addressed to the scope of permissible cross-jurisdictional
expansions of jurisdiction between the courts of different sovereignties. As
a result, such rules were fashioned without reference to Article III’s
careful prescription and limitation of federal court jurisdiction in relation
to that of state courts and do not provide a proper basis for resolving such
questions.129
Second, historic joinder practice within law courts, though not confined
to claims arising from the same transaction, was extremely limited. No
generalized joinder rules existed.130 Every suit had to be brought under a
writ, and each writ had its own peculiarities. For example, a writ of
trespass allowed multiple claims to be brought even if they were factually
unrelated, but multiple claims for breach of contract had to be brought
separately.131 Joinder of parties also depended upon the type of writ: Joint
property owners had to be joined when bringing an action in tort;132
defendants who acted in concert were permitted—but not required—to be
joined;133 and joint obligees and obligors had to be joined in contract
actions.134
Equity joinder practice was more liberal, permitting all claims between
a single plaintiff and a single defendant to be joined so long as they were
not “multifarious” and permitting joinder of multiple parties when
necessary to resolve an entire controversy.135 However, these liberal
joinder provisions assumed that all claims to be joined were equitable in
nature. “[A]s long as law and equity were maintained as separate systems,
it still was not possible to join a legal claim with an equitable claim in
either court.”136

129. Id.
130. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES
AND MATERIALS 649 (9th ed. 2005).
131. Id. (citing Mitchell G. Williams, Pleading Reform in Nineteenth Century America: The
Joinder of Actions at Common Law and Under the Codes, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 299 (1985)).
132. Id. (citing BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 397 (3d ed.
1923)).
133. Id. (citing William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413,
414–15 (1937)).
134. Id. (citing John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L.
REV. 327, 356–74 (1957)).
135. Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 638. But see HAZARD, supra note 130, at 649
(“In theory, equity courts could take any case that could not be handled fairly in the law courts
because of the limitations of the common law joinder rules, but joinder in the equity courts became
increasingly limited between about 1700 and 1850.”).
136. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1581, at 518 (1990).
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The liberal system of equitable joinder thus provides a poor historic
analogy for the kind of cross-system jurisdictional expansion contemplated
by the proponents of a rules-based joinder model. To the extent that equity
embraced the joinder of otherwise legal claims by requiring the joinder of
necessary parties, permitting the intervention of third parties, authorizing
interpleader actions, and through the class action device, it did so only
when such joinder was necessary to permit the court to render a complete
decree or to prevent practical prejudice to existing parties or to parties not
before the court who possessed a “common interest” in the subject matter
of the action.137 Those joinder authorizations were not based simply on a
transactional or other factual relationship among claims. They did not
authorize the joinder of non-jurisdictional claims where the parties to be
joined or class members had no common interest in the subject matter of
the action, let alone where their claims were entirely unrelated to those
properly before the court.138
The strongest defense to date of an unrestricted rules-based model of
federal jurisdiction is Professor Matasar’s article summarized in the
previous section.139 However, despite his detailed and thoughtful treatment
of this important topic, and its subsequent citation,140 his analysis
ultimately is unpersuasive. As Matasar implicitly recognizes, his parsing
of the “common nucleus” and “ordinarily be expected to try” phrases in
Gibbs and their “but if” connector—leading to the conclusion that they
represent separate requirements that can be given sensible independent
meaning only if the more restrictive “common nucleus” requirement is
statutorily or common-law based, while the “ordinary expectation”
requirement extends the scope of the constitutional case as far as validly
prescribed rules of joinder permit—has not been followed by the courts.141
As a matter of ordinary usage, Justice Brennan’s subsequent “ordinarily
be expected to try” description of the scope of the Article III case was
intended merely as a restatement of his earlier definition of the Article III
case in terms of a “common nucleus of operative fact.” For that reason,
courts have not perceived the gossamer contradictions that Matasar
explores and—quite properly—have not given the second articulation
independent constitutional significance.142

137. See Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 638–42.
138. Id. at 640.
139. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 3564, at 66 n.3, 3567, at 108–10 nn.8–11,
3567.1, at 114 n.1; Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: An Important but
Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 31, 34 n.10 (1992); Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 613, 666 n.217 (1999).
141. See Matasar, supra note 22, at 1455–56.
142. See id.
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Matasar is on firmer ground when he points out six contexts in which
no requirement of “fact relatedness” has supported recognized exercises
of supplemental jurisdiction.143 From this, he correctly concludes that the
“common nucleus” formulation does not define the outer boundaries of the
Article III “case” or “controversy.”144 But his additional conclusion that
the scope of the constitutional case is defined by whatever rules for joinder
of parties and claims that Congress or its delegatees may adopt does not
follow.145 That the “common nucleus” formulation does not itself exhaust
the full scope of the constitutional case in no way implies that Congress
or the rules drafters have unlimited power to define and expand the limits
of Article III. As pointed out below, a much narrower model of federal
jurisdiction more closely tied to the purposes of Article III explains each
of the six examples cited by Matasar: In each instance, the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the non-jurisdictional claims before the
court was “necessary and proper” to permit the federal court fairly and
completely to resolve a matter falling within Article III of the Constitution
and properly before it for decision.146
Finally, the obscure language from Osborn quoted by Matasar will not
bear the weight he has placed on it.147 While it defines a “case,” Osborn
does not purport to define which cases presented in the “form prescribed
by law” arise under Article III and which do not. Osborn’s discussion of
that issue had nothing to do with the exercise of jurisdiction over nonjurisdictional claims supplemental to the court’s “arising under” (or
diversity) jurisdiction. Rather, the issue in Osborn was whether a single
claim by the Bank of the United States seeking to invalidate the
enforcement of a state tax and, subsequently, to recover money that state
officials seized from the bank in collection of the tax, arose under federal
law.148 To the extent that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion was addressed
to the issue of federal jurisdiction over questions of state law, it was only
to whether admitted federal jurisdiction over a single federal claim that
otherwise would arise under federal law (because it involved a federal
question as an “original ingredient”) should be held lacking because the
final disposition of that claim also turned on questions of fact and state

143. See id. at 1463–76; supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
144. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1476–77.
145. See id. at 1477.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 232–33, 277–84.
147. See Matasar, supra note 22, at 1479–80 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 818 (1824)).
148. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 818–28. For a detailed discussion of the facts and holding of Osborn,
see Floyd, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 829–31.
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law.149 Given the existence of such an original federal ingredient,150 Chief
Justice Marshall concluded that the “arising under” jurisdiction would be
nugatory unless the entire “arising under” claim, including incidental
questions of state law, were part of the same constitutional case.151 Nothing
in Osborn suggests that the scope of the Article III case extends as far as
Congress or the rules drafters might choose in permitting the joinder of
non-jurisdictional and unrelated state law claims that contain no federal
ingredient at all. Similarly, the broad discretion of Congress and the rules
drafters to fashion and modify joinder rules to achieve the fair and
efficient resolution of claims over which the federal courts do have
jurisdiction does not imply that Congress has unlimited power to expand
the scope of federal jurisdiction through those rules of joinder as Matasar
contends.
Matasar’s argument gives insufficient weight to the fundamental issues
of federalism raised by such an expansive definition of the federal
constitutional case and to the unprecedented intrusion on the reserved
judicial powers of the states that his argument would permit. He contends
that such concerns have improperly “blinded recent courts and
commentators to the simplicity of this constitutional definition of ‘case’
or ‘controversy.’”152 Further, he argues that such fears are overdrawn
because, to the extent expansive joinder provisions are adopted through the
Rules Enabling Act process, such rules should not “‘be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction’” of the federal courts.153 In his view, absent direct
action by Congress, that proscription “limits supplemental jurisdiction to
cases fairly recognizable as similar to those authorized at the Rules’

149. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 830.
150. Osborn’s “original ingredient” formulation of the juridisdiction arising under the
Constitution has itself been subject to substantial criticism as unduly expansive and has rarely been
applied. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481–82 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Osborn . . . appears to have been based on premises that today . . . are
subject to criticism. The basic premise was that every case in which a federal question might arise
must be capable of being commenced in the federal courts, and when so commenced it might . . . be
concluded there despite the fact that the federal question was never raised. . . . There is nothing in
Article III that affirmatively supports the view that original jurisdiction over cases involving federal
questions must extend to every case in which there is the potentiality of appellate jurisdiction.”);
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 847 (5th ed. 2003) (noting Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Lincoln Mills, which in turn
noted the criticism of Osborn); 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3562, at 24 (“The Osborn
theory, that when federal law is an ingredient of the claim there is a federal question, has been
rejected in construing the [statute granting federal courts original jurisdiction over federal-question
cases].”).
151. See Floyd, Supplemental Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 831.
152. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1479.
153. Id. at 1487, 1489 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 82).
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enactment.”154 Regarding Congress, Matasar asserts that Congress likely
will not use its broad constitutional power to expand federal judicial power
at the expense of the states because it has “consistently guarded
independent state authority.”155 Given the supplemental-jurisdiction
statute, which extends supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by Article III—as well as other dramatic expansions of federal
jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims such as those embodied in
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005156 and the Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002157—these arguments regarding congressional
prudence ring hollow today. In any event, they evade the core policy issue
raised by such an unrestricted rules-based model of the federal
constitutional case. As discussed at greater length below, apart from its
lack of historic support, such an expansive approach fails to establish the
required “necessary and proper” link between the purposes of Article III
and the power of the federal courts to entertain claims that fall outside the
limited categories of federal jurisdiction specifically enumerated by the
Constitution.
III. GIBBS AND THE “LOOSE FACTUAL CONNECTION ” ALTERNATIVE TO
THE “SAME TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE ” STANDARD FOR
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
As previously discussed, case law development after the enactment of
the supplemental-jurisdiction statute has increasingly taken the view that
the “same transaction” joinder standard that pervades the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure does not define the outer boundaries of the Article III
“case” with regard to which the statute has authorized the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction. Despite some suggestion that the unrestricted
“delegation” model previously discussed might ultimately define the limits
of the constitutional case, however, the cases tend to recognize that some
sort of factual relationship between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
claims is required to permit their treatment as parts of a single Article III
case. Rather than abandon the Gibbs “common nucleus of operative fact”
test altogether, the cases instead attempt to distinguish the Gibbs test from
the rules-based “same transaction” joinder standard. While adhering to the

154. Id. at 1489.
155. Id.
156. Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 4–5, 119 Stat. 4, 9–13 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1332, 1335, 1441, 1452, 1603 (West 2007)).
157. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1369, 1391, 1697, 1441, 1785 (Supp. IV 2004)). For descriptions of the operation of these
statutes and objections to their jurisdictional provisions see Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note
21, at 624–28, 671–77; Floyd, Interstate Commerce, supra note 21, at 490–93, 499–511, 520–31.
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view that the Gibbs test was intended to and continues to define the outer
boundaries of the constitutional case, the courts have concluded that Gibbs
requires only a “loose factual connection” among claims and that such a
“loose connection” may exist even when the “same transaction” standard
is not satisfied.158
Does the “loose connection” test establish a more satisfactory boundary
for the constitutional case than the “same transaction” standard of the
Federal Rules? Before the enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction
statute, the cases tended to equate the “same transaction” standard of the
Rules with the “common nucleus” formulation of Gibbs.159 That equation
was entirely logical. In defining the scope of pendent-claim jurisdiction in
terms of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” the Court in Gibbs initially
appeared to equate it with the scope of the constitutional case.160 The Court
did not, at that point, articulate a functional basis for adopting the
“common nucleus” formulation. But it later did so in discussing a court’s
discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even when it
exists. The Court explained that the “justification [for pendent-claim
jurisdiction] lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate
to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.”161
As discussed below, this central focus on efficiency rather than
federalism was misplaced and has led to an unfortunate distortion and
misdirection of supplemental-jurisdiction doctrine.162 Accepting this
efficiency-based rationale on its own terms, however, makes clear its close
tie to the central goal of the “same transaction” based joinder provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a leading treatise explains in
discussing Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing
compulsory counterclaims, the prevailing test for interpreting the “same
transaction” standard of that Rule is that a counterclaim is compulsory if
it “is logically related to the claim being asserted by the opposing
party . . . . The hallmark of this approach is its flexibility. Basically it
allows the court to apply Rule 13(a) to any counterclaim that from an
economy or efficiency perspective could be profitably tried with the main
claim.”163 Similarly, the same treatise recommends applying the “logical
relationship” standard to the transactionally based joinder of parties
158. See supra Part II.B.
159. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note
21, at 680 n.284 (collecting additional cases).
160. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see supra note 10 and quoted
text.
161. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
162. See infra notes 166–69 and accompanying text.
163. 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1410, at 61–65 (1990).
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authorized by Rule 20 of the Federal Rules, on the ground that “the
flexibility of this standard enables the federal courts to promote judicial
economy by permitting all reasonably related claims for relief by or
against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding,” noting the
“liberal approach” that many courts have adopted in authorizing joinder
under Rule 20.164
Given the liberal, efficiency-based standard that underlies both the
“common nucleus of operative fact” supplemental-jurisdiction standard of
Gibbs and the “same transaction” joinder standard of the Federal Rules,
equating the two is entirely understandable. Yet, as previously discussed,
after the enactment of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, some courts
have suggested that the former standard is broader than the latter because
the former requires only a “loose factual connection” among claims.
What sense can this make, given that the prevailing interpretation of
the “same transaction” standard of the Federal Rules already embraces all
claims that have a “logical relationship” with each other and therefore
includes all claims for which a joint trial would achieve non-trivial judicial
economies? The “loose connection” test, if it is different, must extend the
scope of Gibbs-based supplemental jurisdiction to claims that are not
logically related and whose trial together therefore would not achieve
significant judicial economies and fairness for the parties. This, of course,
would largely if not entirely divorce the scope of supplemental jurisdiction
from the pivotal rationale of Gibbs, which was directed fundamentally to
achieving fairness and judicial economy.165 Such a “loose connection”
standard would not advance the purposes articulated by Gibbs. It would
instead lend itself to unfairness and strategic abuse by opening the federal
court to the aggregation of many unrelated claims, significantly increasing
the potential for unmanageability, discovery abuse, and jury
confusion—all contrary to the central purposes of Gibbs.
Defenders of the “loose connection” standard might respond that a
district court has ample ability to control such abuses under the
“discretionary” dismissal power of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute.166
164. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653, at 410
(3d ed. 2001). The authors of the treatise further note that “the courts are inclined to find that claims
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence when the likelihood of overlapping proof and
duplication in testimony indicates that separate trials would result in delay, inconvenience, and
added expense to the parties and to the court.” Id. § 1410, at 411–12.
165. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
166. Section 1367(c) provides that a federal court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
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That provision derives from the second component of Gibbs, which
stresses that judicial power is not an obligation and that federal courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when federal claims are
dismissed at the outset, when novel or complex issues of state law are
present, when state law claims predominate, or when other undesirable
effects such as jury confusion may result.167 This response is inadequate,
however, because Gibbs employed this discretionary safeguard on the
assumption that exercising supplemental jurisdiction would promote
judicial economy and fairness when the claims at issue arose from a
common nucleus of operative fact. If only a “loose factual connection”
that does not satisfy the very liberal “logical relationship” standard that
prevails under the transactional joinder standard of the Federal Rules were
required for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, this threshold
presumption would not be warranted: The “logical relationship” standard
itself already embraces all claims whose joinder would significantly
promote judicial economy. Where that purpose is not served, the power of
discretionary dismissal based on case-specific federalism or other
exceptional grounds would not remedy that deficiency and would permit
many state law claims that should be resolved by state courts to populate
the dockets of federal courts. Moreover, considerable authority supports
the view that the discretionary dismissal power of § 1367(c) is more
restricted than the dismissal power articulated in Gibbs and, absent the
novelty or predominance of state law claims, would require the federal
court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction that would exist under the
“loose factual connection” standard absent truly “exceptional
circumstances.”168
The “loose factual connection” standard is objectionable for other
reasons. Once divorced from the efficiency-based rationale of Gibbs, it
becomes entirely bootless. Courts adopting that standard have not
explained how it serves any legitimate purpose of the federal court system

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
167. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (pointing out that supplemental jurisdiction “need not be
exercised in every case in which it is found to exist”).
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). See generally 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3523
(collecting cases supporting the proposition that a court’s discretion to decline supplemental
jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is limited to cases where (1) novel or complex issues of state law are
presented, (2) the jurisdictionally insufficient claim predominates, (3) all the jurisdictionally
sufficient claims have been dismissed, or (4) exceptional circumstances involving compelling
reasons to decline jurisdiction are present).
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or facilitates the Article III work of those courts. Nor have they explained
how the standard would serve the interests of litigants before those courts
in fairly and efficiently disposing of their disputes. Indeed, because the
“loose factual connection” standard is not calculated to achieve significant
judicial economy and fairness by comprehensive disposition of logically
related claims, such a demonstration would be impossible to make. The
“loose” but not “logical” connection standard would bring claims within
federal court jurisdiction that have no legitimate reason for being there.
The result would be to expand federal jurisdiction in the same
impermissible way as under the unrestricted delegation model, raising all
of the objections to that model previously reviewed.
Finally, what sort of factual relationship satisfies the “loose” but not
“logical” factual relationship of this new jurisdictional test? Trying to
distinguish claims that satisfy the “same transaction” joinder standard
because they have a logical relationship from those that do not but still
have a sufficiently “loose” relationship to be resolved by a federal court
presents a “how many angels on the head of a pin” inquiry. Is it sufficient
that the same parties are involved? That the claims at issue, although not
logically related in their legal or factual underpinnings, arose during the
same time period or in the same geographic area? That both claims seek
to redress personal or business injuries of the plaintiff, even though those
injuries may be entirely unrelated? That both seek to impose liability on
the same business or industry? Absent any explanation of the purpose or
function of the “loose relationship” rule that might guide its application,
any effort to distinguish the kinds of factual relationships that support
supplemental jurisdiction from those that do not inevitably will lack logic,
consistency, and purpose.
IV. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER MODEL OF FEDERAL
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Contrary to the assumption of many courts and commentators, a choice
need not be made between an unrestricted rules-based delegation model
of the Article III case, on the one hand, and a transactionally defined
approach of uncertain content, on the other. An alternative approach
adheres closely to the purposes of Article III while giving appropriate
weight to legitimate federal interests.
A. The Necessary and Proper Thesis
In a previous article, I suggested a “necessary and proper” model of
federal jurisdiction.169 In broad outline, that approach does not turn

169. Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 643–52, 680–95.
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mechanically on whether valid procedural rules authorize the joinder of
non-jurisdictional claims in the same action with claims falling within the
scope of Article III, or on whether those claims share some underlying
transactional or other factual relationship. Rather, the model considers the
specific context in which the joinder of parties or claims occurs and the
purposes that joinder serves. In light of that context and purpose, the
model asks whether the joinder of the non-jurisdictional claims is
“necessary and proper” to permit a federal court to perform the tasks
assigned to it by Article III of the Constitution.170 As discussed in that
article, this approach would not limit Congress or the rules drafters by an
artificially narrow conception of what is necessary and proper to achieve
the purposes underlying Article III but would exclude legislation and rules
that expand federal subject matter jurisdiction for the purpose of achieving
non-Article III objectives.171
A critical implication of such a necessary and proper analysis is that a
transactional relationship among claims is neither necessary nor sufficient
to support the exercise of federal supplemental jurisdiction. In some
contexts, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over non-diverse state
law claims may be necessary to permit a federal court fairly and efficiently
to dispose of claims falling within the scope of Article III even absent a
transactional relationship. That is true of permissive counterclaims
asserted under Rule 13(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.172
Professor Matasar’s article provides other examples.173 These examples are
fully consistent with a necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction.
They do not support an unrestricted rules-based model of supplemental
jurisdiction or one based on the existence of a “loose” factual relationship
of uncertain scope.
Conversely, in other contexts, even a strong transactional relationship
among claims is insufficient to meet the requirements of a necessary and
proper jurisdictional model. To that subject I now turn.

170. Id. at 643–52.
171. Id. at 652–77 (evaluating the objectives of the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction
Act of 2002 and the proposed Class Action Fairness Act in necessary and proper terms); see also
Floyd, Interstate Commerce, supra note 21 (criticizing the final version of the Class Action
Fairness Act). This necessary and proper analysis of questions of federal subject matter jurisdiction
is supported by recent scholarship recognizing that federal subject matter jurisdiction is “claim
specific,” requiring that either original or supplemental jurisdiction exist for each claim asserted
in an action filed in a federal court. Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 679–80; see also
John B. Oakley, Integrating Supplemental Jurisdiction and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Progress
Report on the Work of the American Law Institute, 74 IND. L.J. 25, 45–52 (1998).
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b) (“A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an
opposing party that is not compulsory.”).
173. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1463–77.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

312

[V ol. 60

B. The Relevance of a Transactional Relationship to the Scope of
Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Under the Necessary and
Proper Model
Gibbs’s conclusion that the existence of federal supplemental
jurisdiction turns on the existence of a “common nucleus of operative fact”
has been with us for so long that it is difficult to imagine a different
jurisdictional paradigm. The standard’s appeal lies in its ostensible
simplicity, coupled with its strong and explicit grounding in the policy of
avoiding piecemeal litigation of overlapping claims in federal and state
court. As Gibbs emphasized, the justification for supplemental jurisdiction
(in that case, pendent-claim jurisdiction) “lies in considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.”174 Although the Supreme
Court never explained the origins or derivation of the “common nucleus
of operative fact” standard, it seems to have been fashioned with the
obvious policy goals of judicial economy, convenience to litigants, and
comprehensive disposition of litigation in mind. Its enduring power lies in
the strength of those policies and in the easy melding of that approach with
the transactional standard for joinder of parties and claims that pervades
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are designed to achieve just
such comprehensive and efficient disposition of related matters. The
Federal Rules admonish that “[t]hey should be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”175
Under the necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction, however,
the possibility that the exercise of federal jurisdiction may achieve a more
economical and comprehensive disposition of factually related claims than
would their separate adjudication in federal and state court is not, in itself,
a sufficient basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse state law claims. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
considerations of judicial economy, standing alone, do not provide an
adequate basis for the expansion of federal jurisdiction at the expense of
state courts.176 As Justice Black observed in narrowly construing the “in

174. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. For rules permitting the joinder of parties and claims based on the
existence of a transactional relationship among claims, see, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)
(compulsory counterclaims); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (cross-claims between co-parties); FED. R. CIV.
P. 14(a) (claims asserted by or against a third-party defendant); FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (claims
asserted by multiple plaintiffs or against multiple defendants).
176. See Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 684–85 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 (1984), Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175,
191 (1909), and John P. Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 129, 154 (1987)); id. at 685 n.310 (“No matter how great the efficiency justifications for
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aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition of
federal injunctions of parallel state proceedings: “[F]rom the beginning we
have had in this country two essentially separate legal
systems. . . . Understandably this dual court system was bound to lead to
conflicts and frictions.”177 This expectation of overlapping, sometimes
inefficient state and federal litigation of the same subject matter rests, not
merely on statutory grounds, but on the “fundamental constitutional
independence of the States and their courts.”178
To define the proper scope of supplemental jurisdiction, a distinction
must be drawn between achieving intrasystem judicial economy and
fairness within the federal court system, and achieving intersystem judicial
economy in the resolution of related claims pending in both federal and
state court. The necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction focuses
on whether the exercise of federal jurisdiction is necessary and proper to
permit federal courts fairly and efficiently to resolve claims falling within
the categories of judicial power enumerated in Article III. If the federal
courts are able to do so without addressing possibly overlapping nondiverse state law claims, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims is improper.179
Neither Gibbs’s broad recognition of the importance of judicial
economy nor the transactionally based joinder standards of the Federal
Rules would be significantly altered or threatened by adopting a necessary
and proper approach to the definition of the federal constitutional case.
Efficiency considerations would remain highly relevant in determining
whether it is necessary and proper for federal courts to entertain
transactionally related non-diverse state law claims in order to perform the
tasks that the Constitution and Congress assign to them. Consider, for
example, Rule 20, which permits joinder of claims by plaintiffs or against
defendants that arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences” and share a common question of law or
fact.180 Under the necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction,
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims that
satisfy Rule 20 would be proper.181 That is not simply because exercising

pendent jurisdiction, it cannot be allowed if not authorized by the Constitution and the
[jurisdictional] statute.” (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power:
The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 660
(1985))).
177. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970).
178. Id. at 287.
179. Cf. Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1991) (“It has long been the rule that it is not
necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.”).
180. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
181. The supplemental-jurisdiction statute authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
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such jurisdiction would achieve significant intersystem judicial economies
(although it would). Rather, as has been frequently recognized, a plaintiff
with a federal claim against one defendant and a non-diverse state law
claim against another defendant that is transactionally related to the federal
claim might be significantly deterred from invoking federal jurisdiction to
resolve her Article III claim if faced with the additional cost and
possibility of inconsistent judgments that would attend the separate
litigation of those claims in federal and state court.182 Similarly, the
assertion of both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims by multiple
plaintiffs in a single action may be necessary to enhance the strength and
economic viability of their case.183
In short, the necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction supplies
both functional purpose and intelligible content to the degree of factual
connection between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims required
to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. If the claims are

to the widest extent permitted by the Constitution in all federal-question cases. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) (2000) (“Except as provided in subsections (b) [relating to diversity cases] and (c)
[relating to discretionary declinations of jurisdiction] . . . in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”). In
diversity cases, subsection (b) expressly forbids exercising supplemental jurisdiction over claims
by plaintiffs against defendants joined under Rule 20. Id. § 1367(b). It does not specifically exclude
claims by plaintiffs joined under Rule 20. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545
U.S. 546 (2005), the Supreme Court held that, by this omission, the statute effectively overruled
the rule against aggregating the claims of multiple plaintiffs to satisfy the jurisdictional amount in
diversity cases but did not overrule the “complete diversity” requirement itself. Id. at 571. This
Article does not address the correctness of that decision. However, under the necessary and proper
model of federal jurisdiction, Congress may confer supplemental jurisdiction over all
transactionally related claims properly joined under Rule 20, whether in federal-question or
diversity cases.
182. AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 430 n.13 (1969) (“Congress must be able to remove impediments of this kind that might
make the federal forum less attractive than the state courts and thus impose a burden on invoking
federal jurisdiction.”); id. at 434; see also, e.g., Matasar, supra note 22, at 1404–06 & n.6; Arthur
R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 4 (1985).
183. For a full development of this argument, see Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at
673–74, 687–88. This is most apparent, for example, in connection with the “common question”
class actions authorized by Rule 23(b)(3), which amounts to a permissive joinder device designed
to ensure the economic viability of small claims. See id. at 691–92; see also Jinks v. Richland
County, 538 U.S. 456, 463 (2003) (sustaining the § 1367(d) provision tolling state statutes of
limitations on claims asserted under the supplemental-jurisdiction authorization of § 1367(a) that
were later dismissed by the federal court, relying on the necessary and proper rationale that the
provision “eliminates a serious impediment to access to the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs
pursuing federal- and state-law claims that ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact’”
(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))).
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sufficiently factually related that litigating them separately would deter a
litigant with an Article III claim from resorting to federal court, then the
plaintiff’s related non-diverse state law claims should fall within the
supplemental jurisdiction of the federal court. If no significant deterrent
exists—because significant judicial economy and avoidance of
inconsistent outcomes would not result from their separate trials in federal
and state court—exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is improper. Under
this functional analysis, there is no “third category” of claims that fall
outside the prevailing “logical relationship” interpretation of the “same
transaction” joinder standard of the Federal Rules but that still relate
sufficiently “loosely” to a litigant’s jurisdictional claims to fall within the
supplemental jurisdiction of the federal court. No third category exists
because, when viewed in functional-deterrence terms, the efficiency-based
joinder standard of the Federal Rules extends as far as necessary to avoid
significantly deterring litigants from litigating Article III claims in federal
court.
This approach also explains Gibbs’s secondary and much debated
“ordinarily be expected to try” language in relation to its “common
nucleus of operative fact” formulation for the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction.184 In attempting to ascribe separate meaning to the “common
nucleus” and “ordinarily be expected to try” phrases of Gibbs, Professor
Matasar concluded that they were either superfluous or contradictory.185
Viewed in functional terms, however, Gibbs’s subsequent rephrasing of
the supplemental-jurisdiction test gives the “common nucleus” formulation
intelligible content by highlighting its functional justification—providing
incentives to litigants to invoke the federal forum. If a litigant’s Article III
and non-diverse state law claims are so factually related that she would
“ordinarily be expected to try” them all in one judicial proceeding, the
inability to do so could deter her from invoking the federal forum, thus
undermining the purposes of Article III.
But does the functional “deterrence” view of the permissible scope of
the necessary and proper Article III case prove that Matasar was correct
after all? Even the non-transactional joinder provisions of the Federal
Rules—particularly Rule 18, which authorizes a litigant properly asserting
one claim in federal court to join with it any other claim that she has
against the opposing party186—are based on the drafters’ determination
184. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (“The state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a
plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole.”).
185. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1462.
186. “A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may
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that, once a party has properly invoked federal jurisdiction against an
opponent, she should not be required to initiate multiple actions to assert
all of her existing claims against the same party. However, this rationale,
which can be assumed properly to define the desirable scope of one action
within a single system of courts without regard to the limitations of their
subject matter jurisdiction, cannot itself define those limits. The Federal
Rules are procedurally—not jurisdictionally—oriented. They are based on
considerations of what enlightened rules of pleading within a single
system of courts should permit, not on constitutional considerations
regarding the allocation of judicial power between federal and state courts.
In particular, Rule 18 does not reflect a determination by the rules drafters
that the joinder of unrelated claims in the same action will achieve
sufficient trial economy or avoid inconsistent determinations of the same
issues of law and fact in separate proceedings. As leading commentators
have noted, Rule 18 specifies the scope of the claims that may be properly
joined in the same pleading and does not represent a conclusion that the
joint trial of those claims would be convenient or desirable. The drafters
of the Federal Rules “intended Rule 18(a) to deal only with questions of
joinder of claims at the pleading stage and not to matters of trial
convenience.”187
Of course, a litigant might, for purely strategic reasons, wish to assert
as many claims as possible against an opponent. But this possibility hardly
establishes that the inability to do so would significantly deter a litigant
from bringing her Article III claims in federal court. Indeed, even greater
strategic advantage might frequently result from burdening an opponent
with unrelated lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions. Gibbs’s focus on claims
that a litigant would “ordinarily be expected to try” in one proceeding
clearly contains a normative component—not what an aberrant or
particularly aggressive litigant might sometimes wish to do, but what a
reasonable litigant should, as a matter of ordinary expectation, be
permitted to do to avoid a significant adverse impact on the invocation and
exercise of federal jurisdiction to resolve Article III claims. Implicitly,
Gibbs recognized that no adverse impact reasonably could be expected to
result if the non-jurisdictional claims that a litigant advances are factually
unrelated to claims falling within the scope of Article III, because neither
significant judicial or litigant diseconomies nor the avoidance of
inconsistent outcomes would result from the separate trial of such claims
in federal and state courts.

join . . . as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
187. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1586, at 532; see also id. §§ 1582–85, at 520–31. Rule
42(b) provides that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court
may order a separate trial of one or more separate . . . claims . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
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That is not to say that exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
factually unrelated claims is never appropriate under the necessary and
proper model of federal jurisdiction. Critics of the Gibbs test have
recognized that the test is too narrow in some contexts.188 In some
circumstances, the necessary and proper model would sustain the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction without a close—or even any—factual
connection between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims.
Conversely, under the necessary and proper model, the existence of a
transactional, “common nucleus,” or other factual relationship among
claims does not automatically establish that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction would serve the purposes of Article III. The next two sections
review some of the contexts in which tests for supplemental jurisdiction
based solely on the factual relationship among claims are over- and underinclusive.
C. Contexts in Which a Transactional Relationship Among Claims Is
Insufficient to Support the Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction
If most of the transactionally based joinder provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would support the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction under the necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction,
why quarrel with the broad efficiency-based approach exemplified by
Gibbs or deny that judicial economy ultimately provides the touchstone for
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction? The answer is that, in some
contexts, such an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is not necessary to
permit a federal court fairly and efficiently to resolve Article III claims or
to avoid deterring litigants possessing such claims from invoking a federal
forum to resolve them.
Two prominent examples are provided by the Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002189 and the statutory recommendations set out
in the 1994 Report of the ALI’s Complex Litigation Project.190 Both are
focused on the desirability of eliminating overlapping, duplicative federal
and state court litigation of identical issues of law and fact arising from
single accidents (in the case of the Act) or mass-tort and contract disputes
(in the case of the complex litigation project). Provided that certain preconditions are met, the Multiparty, Multiforum Act confers original federal
court jurisdiction over any civil action involving “minimal diversity [of
citizenship] between adverse parties that arises from a single accident,

188. See supra Part II.A.
189. Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758, at 826–29 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1391, 1697, 1441, 1785 (Supp. IV 2004)).
190. AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
(1994).
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where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete
location.”191 The Act thus provides for original jurisdiction based on
“minimal” rather than the “complete” diversity between opposing parties
required under the general statutory conferral of diversity jurisdiction on
the federal courts.192 The Act also permits removal of actions filed in state
court against a party to an action that was or could have been filed in
federal court under the Act’s provision for original jurisdiction and that
arises from the same accident as the removed action. Removal is permitted
“even if the action to be removed could not have been brought in a district
court as an original matter.”193 The latter provision thus permits a state
court action arising entirely under state law in which all of the parties are
citizens of the same state to be removed to federal court if the defendant
in that action is a party to an action (filed by other parties) that arises from
the same accident and falls within the Act’s provision for original
jurisdiction. Similarly, the ALI’s 1994 statutory recommendations would
have permitted removal of a state court action involving no diversity of
citizenship or federal question if the state action arose from the same
transaction or occurrence and shared a common question of fact with a
pending federal action.194
The Multiparty, Multiforum Act grounded its removal provision on the
conclusion that the “complete diversity” interpretation of the general
diversity statute is only a statutory, rather than a constitutional,
limitation.195 The ALI statutory recommendations endorsed that view but
also relied on the concept that a transactional relationship between the
removed action and actions properly pending in federal court would

191. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. IV 2004). One of the following additional conditions must
be satisfied: (1) one defendant must reside in a state different from that in which the accident
occurred, (2) any two defendants must reside in different states, or (3) substantial parts of the
accident must occur in different states. Id. These conditions are designed to identify situations in
which dispersed litigation arising from the same accident could be expected to occur.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000); see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806) (Marshall, C.J.).
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
194. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 190, § 5.01(a). Section 5.01(a) provides that multiple civil
actions in different state courts may be removed to federal court and consolidated under the
direction of the Complex Litigation Panel “if the removed actions arise from the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as an action pending in the federal court, and
share a common question of fact with that action,” id., provided that (1) the various state court
actions involve common questions of fact and the “consolidation will promote the just, efficient,
and fair conduct of the actions,” id. § 3.01(a), and (2) such removal and consolidation would not
“unduly disrupt or impinge upon state court or regulatory proceedings or impose an undue burden
on the federal courts,” id. § 5.01(a)(2). Section 5.01(e) permits removal upon either the removal
request by any party or the certification request of any state judge. Id. § 5.01(e).
195. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967); see also Floyd,
Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 624–28.
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support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the removed nondiverse state law actions.196
These removal provisions are invalid to the extent that they assume that
the formal presence of “minimal diversity” of citizenship between any two
adverse parties found somewhere in an aggregation of claims whose
joinder is authorized by statute or the Federal Rules supports federal
jurisdiction over the entire action regardless of the purpose or context of
that joinder.197 Rather, the jurisdictional question those provisions present
should be viewed as identical to the supplemental-jurisdiction analysis
outlined in this Article: for all assertions of federal jurisdiction over nondiverse state law claims or actions, the pivotal question is whether that
exercise of jurisdiction is necessary and proper to achieve the purposes
underlying the enumerated and limited grants of federal judicial power set
out in Article III. If, considering the context in which it arises and the
purposes that it serves, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is unnecessary
to permit the federal courts fairly, efficiently, and completely to resolve
the matters specifically assigned to them by the Constitution, neither the
formal presence of “minimal diversity” between parties nor the presence
of a transactional relationship among claims satisfies that test.
Viewed in this light, the provisions of the Multiparty, Multiforum Act
and the ALI’s proposal for removal of state law, state court actions
involving no diversity of citizenship fall outside the boundaries of Article
III. Even though the removed claims may be transactionally related to
claims falling within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, removal
is unnecessary to permit the federal courts fairly, efficiently, and
completely to resolve claims properly falling within their original
jurisdiction under Article III. The fact that resolving all related claims in
one court system might achieve greater intersystem judicial economy does
not establish that the courts of either system must be able to entertain all
related claims to resolve those that fall within their original jurisdiction.198
Nor is it necessary for federal courts to entertain such removed actions to
provide the necessary incentive for litigants possessing Article III claims
to invoke federal jurisdiction. The removal provisions in question assume
that those litigants have already invoked a federal forum. At most, the
previously outlined deterrence rationale would permit those litigants
properly in federal court to assert all of their own transactionally related
state law claims. But the deterrence rationale does not justify permitting
other litigants by whom or against whom only non-diverse state law claims
are asserted to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court.

196. See Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 620–24.
197. See id. for an in-depth development of this argument.
198. See supra Part IV.B.
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State courts may resolve issues of law and fact in actions involving no
diversity of citizenship or federal question differently than federal courts
entertaining transactionally related claims and actions falling within
Article III. But this fact does not establish the required necessary and
proper connection for exercising supplemental jurisdiction under Article
III. Inconsistent resolution of separate claims involving different parties
in separate actions is endemic to litigation in both federal and state courts.
Factually related claims by different parties are likely to differ in
significant ways that could lead to different outcomes. This is why
applying principles of non-mutual collateral estoppel in related mass-tort
actions by or against new parties has proved so problematic.199 Parties may
have different litigation strategies, different counsel and resources,
different degrees of risk aversion, and different jury pools, all of which
create a normal expectation that the outcomes of related cases may vary
significantly.200 This variance in outcomes neither prevents federal courts
from resolving the matters entrusted to them by the Constitution nor casts
any doubt on the fairness or validity of their judgments. To the contrary,

199. The asbestos litigation in the 1980s illustrates the difficulty of asserting non-mutual
collateral estoppel in many situations, even in cases involving factually related claims. An early
asbestos decision, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), held
certain asbestos manufacturers liable for causing the plaintiff’s asbestosis and mesothelioma. Id.
at 1081. In a subsequent asbestos action, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353
(E.D. Tex. 1981), rev’d, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982), the trial court collaterally estopped the
defendant asbestos companies, some of which had been defendants in Borel, from (1) arguing that
asbestos exposure did not cause either asbestosis or mesothelioma and (2) asserting a state-of-theart defense. See id. at 1361–63 (“[N]o evidence shall be introduced on the issue of whether asbestos
causes either asbestosis or mesothelioma. . . . In essence, no evidence shall be admitted with respect
to a state of the art defense.”). The court collaterally estopped the defendants whether they had been
parties in Borel or not. Id. at 1361.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th
Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendants who had not been parties in Borel
lacked sufficient privity with the Borel defendants to have effectively had their day in court in the
earlier action. See id. at 338–40. The Fifth Circuit also concluded that it would be unfair to estop
the Borel defendants because (1) the Borel decision was “ambiguous as to certain key issues,” id.
at 343, (2) there were “inconsistent [prior] verdicts,” id. at 345–46, and (3) Borel’s result of
$68,000 liability did not “foreshadow multimillion dollar asbestos liability,” id. at 346. Thus, the
factual and procedural similarities were not sufficient for the trial court to properly rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel. The trial court’s failed effort to use collateral estoppel as a means of
bringing order to the asbestos litigation has been discussed by Professor McGovern. See Francis
E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 662–63 (1989); see
also In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a fact
that is merely “supportive of” a prior determination does not satisfy the “critical and necessary to
the [prior] judgment” requirement of collateral estoppel to preclude litigation of that fact in
subsequent litigation).
200. See Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A
Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 7–9, 20–21 (1990).
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recent scholarship suggests that the “maturity” of mass-tort litigation
achieved by dispersed outcomes in federal and state court may be essential
to a proper evaluation of novel and unliquidated claims and, ultimately, to
their fair and efficient global resolution.201 As Judge Posner observed in a
leading decision, only “‘a decentralized process of multiple trials,
involving different juries, and different standards of liability, in different
jurisdictions’” yields the information needed to accurately evaluate masstort claims.202

201. In 1999, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules published its Report on Mass Tort
Litigation. WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT ON
MASS TORT LITIGATION (1999). The report’s discussion of the phenomenon of the mature mass tort
is instructive. It concludes that “the maturation process is often crucial to determining the
consequences of mass tort litigation.” Id. at 25. Using the asbestos litigation as an example of the
maturation process, the report notes that in the early days of the asbestos litigation cycle, “plaintiffs
handled discovery independently and the defendant manufacturers were generally successful.” Id.
at 23. As documents demonstrating liability were discovered and as scientific evidence of causation
came to light, an equilibrium developed and plaintiffs began to win in nearly half of all cases.
“Ultimately, through repeated trials and settlements, an equilibrium was reached in which the
plaintiffs and the defendants understood the limits of liability and the appropriate range of
settlement.” Id. Furthermore, even aspects of an asbestos claim that were unique to each
plaintiff—such as exposure and individual injury—could be measured against the background of
previous cases. Id.
When a mass tort moves toward a global settlement too early, as occurred in the silicone breast
implant litigation, the lack of maturity may defeat settlement possibilities. In the silicone breast
implant litigation, an early proposed class settlement resulted in approximately 300,000 members
joining the plaintiff settlement class. Id. at 24. There had been no individual trials to further the
parties’ understanding of the tort or the science surrounding the alleged injuries. Although the
defendants offered a settlement of $4.25 billion, the sheer number of claimants undermined the
proposal. Id. at 24–25. The parties then broke the “mass tort into a combination of larger and
smaller components for settlement or trial, developing a different type of maturation process
through the repetition of smaller-scale settlements.” Id. at 25.
In the process of a mass tort’s maturation, it may take years to develop the necessary scientific
information. Id. Thus, the report concludes that “[p]remature judicial attempts to determine whether
injuries are caused by a product or substance can be so unreliable that the nature of the litigation
is distorted dramatically.” Id.; see also Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos
Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1739 n.42 (2002) (“The concept of maturity suggests that, over
time, mass tort litigation will establish rather consistent, predictable values. The same type of cases
tried over and over and settled over and over will generate a marketplace of consistent values. The
suggestion here is that the legal rules matured but that the plaintiff profile continued to evolve.”);
Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1851, 1855 (1997) (“The ‘mature’ mass tort involves situations in which, for example,
there have been multiple trials in multiple jurisdictions with a consensus that the product—at least
in a given set of circumstances—is unreasonably dangerous and a solvent defendant is liable for
particular types of harms. The uncertainty lies in the issues of exposure, specific causation, and
individual harm. Interstate and intrafederal cooperation has become routine in these types of cases.”
(footnote omitted)).
202. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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Thus, the existence of a transactional relationship between claims or
actions involving different parties simultaneously pending in both federal
and state court would not in itself justify the removal of state court
litigation to federal court merely because the state court might resolve
similar or identical issues of law or fact differently than would a federal
court. That situation should be contrasted with one in which the parties to
the related federal and state court actions are the same.203 Here, there is
arguably greater potential for overlapping and inconsistent orders on
discovery and other pre-trial matters that could undermine a federal court’s
ability to control the proceedings before it.204 Moreover, because the
judgment of a state court that first reaches a decision must, in most
circumstances, be given claim and issue preclusive effect by a federal
court under the full faith and credit statute,205 the presence of such parallel
federal–state litigation between the same parties may create a race to
judgment that adversely affects the actions or may render meaningless the
time and energy devoted to the federal action.
On closer examination, however, these arguments are unpersuasive.
Under the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the AntiInjunction Act and the All Writs Act, federal courts already possess the
power to enjoin parallel state proceedings that threaten the conduct of
pending federal litigation or that undermine the federal courts’ orders.206
203. Of course, if only two parties are involved and they have diverse citizenship, removal is
authorized if the defendant is not a citizen of the state from which removal was sought. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). The situation described in the main text could occur when there is not
complete diversity in the state court action or when a federal action raises a federal question and
a state action arising from the same transaction advances only state law claims between citizens of
the same state.
204. For example, the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328
(2d Cir. 1985), upheld a federal district court’s injunction of potential state proceedings where such
state proceedings interfered with the federal court’s ability to reach a settlement agreement in a
consolidated case dealing with securities fraud. Id. at 331, 338. Professors Tidmarsh and Trangsrud
note that the Baldwin-United decision “clearly locat[es] the source of the power to enjoin state
proceedings in the All-Writs Act.” JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 409 (1998); see also infra note 206 (discussing the All Writs Act and
the Anti-Injunction Act).
205. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 4469, at 71–72 (2002) (“The full faith and credit
statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738, is the major statutory source of the rule that federal courts must honor
the res judicata effects of state-court judgments.”).
206. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000), provides that federal courts “may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.” The Anti-Injunction Act § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), however, prohibits
a federal court from issuing an injunction to “stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.”
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue that the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act “may be fairly read as incorporating [the] historical in rem
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The rarity with which such injunctions have been found to be necessary207
undercuts the existence of a general necessary and proper rationale for the
removal from state to federal court of parallel actions between the same
parties. Despite broad language in some opinions, decisions authorizing
injunctions of parallel state proceedings under the Anti-Injunction Act
have recognized that duplicative in personam litigation—or the potential
preclusive effect of a state judgment in federal court when it is ultimately
rendered—does not justify a conclusion that a federal injunction is
necessary in aid of federal court jurisdiction.208 As one court put it, the

exception,” which permitted a federal court that first exercised jurisdiction over a res to enjoin state
court proceedings from exerting jurisdiction over the same res. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
164, § 4225, at 91–92 (2007). However, they also note that there is support for a broader reading
of this exception, pointing to the Supreme Court’s statement that the exception may “allow federal
relief where [it] is ‘necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and
authority to decide that case.’” Id. § 4225, at 94 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970)). Although the general rule is that “an injunction
cannot issue to restrain a state action in personam involving the same subject matter from going on
at the same time,” id. § 4225, at 98, Wright, Miller, and Cooper conclude that there have been signs
of greater flexibility in some recent decisions, id. § 4225, at 94–97 & nn. 9–11. As discussed in the
main text, however, most if not all of these exceptional cases involved situations in which a state
court order threatened to undermine a conditionally or finally approved settlement of the federal
action or contradicted a federal court’s orders entered to govern the proceedings before it. See, e.g.,
In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 239 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that where a settlement class had been
conditionally certified and the settlement provisionally approved, the federal court properly
enjoined the implementation of a state court order purporting to opt members of a state court class
out of the federal action); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355,
369–70 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that where a federal court had entered final approval of a federal
class action settlement, the court properly enjoined a state court proceeding that would have
seriously undermined the federal settlement); Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1205–06
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a federal court in a consolidated action may enjoin state court
proceedings to prevent a state court from circumventing its discovery order); Carlough v. Amchem
Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 203–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting an injunction of a state court action where
a federal class action settlement was imminent and the state court proceeding was perceived as a
“preemptive strike” against the federal court); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d at 338
(upholding a district court’s injunction of related state court proceedings where the federal court
had tentatively approved a settlement order as to some defendants and settlement negotiations with
the remaining defendants were close to fruition); United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d
802, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding an injunction against state court proceedings that enjoined
conduct required for a local governmental agency to comply with a previous federal court order);
Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 943 (5th Cir.) (upholding an injunction against
a state court custody proceeding that was intended to circumvent a federal court’s desegregation
plan), modified on other grounds, 653 F.2d 941 (5th. Cir. 1981).
207. See supra note 206.
208. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 236, 239 (stating that the danger “[t]hat a state
court may resolve an issue first (which may operate as res judicata), is not by itself a sufficient
threat to the federal court’s jurisdiction that justifies an injunction,” but upholding an injunction
against a state court order purporting to opt a class out of a conditionally approved federal
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state court litigation must not simply duplicate the federal action or
threaten to reach judgment first but “must interfere with the federal court’s
own path to judgment” on the matters properly before it.209
Moreover, the fact that a preclusive state court judgment resolving
identical issues of law or fact might preempt or negate federal proceedings
already conducted improperly looks backward to the “sunk costs” of
federal litigation that would have been incurred in any event. Instead, the
relevant consideration is the future costs to both litigants and the federal
judicial system that will be necessary to conclude the federal action.
Broadly speaking, both the Full Faith and Credit Clause210 and its
implementing legislation aim to conserve judicial and litigant resources,
and to further the strong interest in finality and repose by avoiding
relitigation of matters already settled between the parties. It is difficult to
see how this policy, which is generally consistent with the purposes of the
Multiparty, Multiforum Act211 and the ALI’s proposals,212 could create a

settlement).
209. Id. at 234.
210. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. This section is implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
211. The Multiparty, Multiforum Act permits removal of non-diverse state law claims pending
in state court that are transactionally related to claims falling within the original jurisdiction
conferred by the Act. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. The Act requires the
removed action to be filed against a party that is also a party to an action falling within the Act’s
conferral of original federal jurisdiction in actions arising out of a single accident involving
minimal diversity of citizenship. Thus, one could argue that some or all of the dangers of
interference with a pending federal proceeding—such as a race to judgment or wasteful federal
proceedings aborted by the collateral estoppel effect of a previous state court judgment—might
exist in some circumstances. But the impact of collateral estoppel in aborting the time and effort
previously invested in the federal proceeding as a result of the preclusive effect of the state court’s
judgment is very restricted. In cases brought by other parties against a defendant in an action falling
within the Act’s provisions for original jurisdiction, the judgment in the state court action must be
reached first, be adverse to the defendant, involve precisely the same issues as the federal action,
and involve no conditions of unfairness that would preclude the application of offensive non-mutual
collateral estoppel under the Parklane Hosiery doctrine. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 329–31 (1979); see also Syverson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1078–79
(9th Cir. 2007).
In the converse situation—where the judgment in the state court action is adverse to state
plaintiffs who differed from the plaintiffs in the federal action against the same defendant—nonmutual collateral estoppel cannot apply against the federal plaintiffs because they are non-parties
to the state court action. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 795–97 (1996); see also
S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 167–68 (1999). Thus, in the context of the
Multiparty, Multiforum Act, this argument is even less persuasive than in the context of parallel
federal and state proceedings between the same parties. In light of the attenuated and highly
speculative nature of this entire line of argument, a much clearer indication that Congress
predicated the removal provisions of the Act on such concerns should be required before they are
sustained under the necessary and proper model of federal supplemental jurisdiction. See Floyd,
Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 651 (“Courts should not strain to supply, ex post, some
‘conceivable’ rationale that possibly might have led Congress to enact the proposed
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necessary and proper basis for the removal and federal consolidation of
parallel state court litigation between the same parties.213 Preemption
through removal or injunction of state court litigation before judgment on
the ground that a judgment, when ultimately entered, might have
preclusive effect in a pending federal action would represent a dramatic
change in long-standing federal policy. This policy, embodied in the
provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act and grounded in fundamental
considerations of federalism, prohibits federal injunctions of parallel state
court litigation between the same parties in almost all circumstances,
despite the Act’s explicit authorization of such injunctions when they are
“necessary in aid of [the district court’s] jurisdiction.”214 In sum, the
presence of parallel federal and state litigation involving transactionally
related claims does not, without more, establish a basis for exercising
supplemental federal subject matter jurisdiction over non-diverse state law
claims.

legislation . . . no [matter] how attenuated it might be and without any evidence that Congress
shared that objective.”).
212. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
213. When the state judgment relates to issues not yet resolved in the federal proceedings,
preclusion will save future federal judicial and litigant resources. When the state judgment conflicts
with interlocutory orders already entered in the federal proceedings, the judgment may either
reduce or increase subsequent costs in the federal action, and thus does not support the general
conclusion that costs will be increased. Even if costs increase, the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
its implementing statute reflect the conclusion that such occasional costs are outweighed by a
general policy of intersystem preclusion, undercutting any necessary and proper rationale for
removal of parallel state proceedings simply because they may in the future result in a judgment
that forecloses or determines the scope of subsequent federal litigation.
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970), the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted this provision
to prohibit such in-aid-of-jurisdiction injunctions based merely on the presence of parallel federal
and state proceedings between the same parties, despite the possibility of inconsistent outcomes.
Id. at 295–97. The exception to the Act’s broad prohibition of federal court injunctions of state
proceedings applied only when its issuance was “necessary to prevent a state court from so
interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the
federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that case.” Id. at 295 (emphasis added). That
standard was not satisfied by the mere possibility of inconsistent outcomes. Id. at 296. The Court’s
narrow interpretation was based on “the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and
their courts.” Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
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D. Non-transactional Relationships That Support the Exercise of
Supplemental Jurisdiction
1. Preventing Prejudice from the Operation of the Court’s Decree
Many of the current joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not depend on the existence of a transactional relationship
among the claims to be joined (although, in many instances, such a
transactional relationship may exist). Rather, those provisions are designed
to ensure that the court can render a complete and effective decree with
respect to a claim or claims within its Article III jurisdiction without
prejudicing, as a practical matter, the interests of those before the court or
of absent parties.
Rule 14’s provision for the impleader of third-party defendants by the
original defendants named in the action provides an example. Rule 14
authorizes an original defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, to assert a claim
against “a nonparty who is or may be liable to [the third-party plaintiff] for
all or part of the claim against [the third-party plaintiff].”215 Such thirdparty complaints are not based on a transactional relationship but on the
existence of a claim of “derivative liability” against the third-party
defendant, such as a claim for contribution or indemnity, in the event the
original defendant is held liable to the plaintiff.216 The Rule protects a
defendant hauled involuntarily into court from the necessity of duplicative
litigation and the potential for unfairness resulting from inconsistent
judgments that might result if the defendant were forced to litigate the
derivative-liability claim in a separate action.217 While such claims are
frequently transactionally related to the plaintiff’s claim against the
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
216. As a leading treatise notes:
A third-party claim may be asserted under Rule 14(a) only when the third party’s
liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or when the
third party is secondarily liable to defendant. If the claim is separate or
independent from the main action, impleader will be denied. The secondary or
derivative liability notion is central and it is irrelevant whether the basis of the
third-party claim is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied
warranty, or some other theory. But impleader is proper only when a right to relief
exists under the applicable substantive law.
6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1446, at 355–67 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
217. See id. § 1442, at 290 (allowing a defendant to implead a third party based on derivative
liability promotes efficiency and “increases the likelihood that consistent results will be reached
when multiple claims turn upon identical or similar proof”); see also 3 MOORE, supra note 56,
§ 14.03[1] (explaining that Rule 14(a) impleader “avoids the possibility of inconsistent
judgments”).
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original defendant—as in actions seeking contribution by joint
tortfeasors—they need not be. For example, a third-party claim based on
a pre-existing insurance or indemnity contract would fall within Rule 14(a)
even though the factual basis for the claim turns on the existence and
coverage of the contract, rather than on the events giving rise to the
plaintiff’s claim. As the Supreme Court recognized in Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,218 a third-party complaint’s “relation to the
original complaint is thus not mere factual similarity but logical
dependence.”219
Federal courts have regularly sustained supplemental jurisdiction over
such third-party claims even though the claims are based on state law and
are asserted between citizens of the same state.220 In Owen, the Court
rejected the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a claim asserted by
the original plaintiff against a third party impleaded by the original
defendant under Rule 14(a) because doing so might subvert the complete-

218. 437 U.S. 365 (1978), superceded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No 101-650, § 301(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113–14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 1367 (2000)).
219. Id. at 371.
220. As leading commentators have noted:
[I]n situations in which there is no independent subject matter jurisdiction over a
third-party claim (as, for example, when both parties to the impleader claim are
citizens of the same state and no federal question is involved), on what theory do
the courts exercise ancillary jurisdiction? The mere provision for third-party
claims in Rule 14 is not a sufficient basis for extending subject matter jurisdiction
to them. Although it is clear that the value of Rule 14 would be diminished
substantially if the ordinary jurisdictional strictures were applied to third-party
actions, Rule 82 expressly provides that the rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the courts.
The justification for applying ancillary jurisdiction is independent of Rule 14;
indeed, it finds its source outside the federal rules. This proposition was stated by
the Second Circuit in Dery v. Wyer[, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959),] in the
following fashion:
Rule 14 does not extend jurisdiction. It merely sanctions an impleader
procedure which rests upon the broad conception of a claim as comprising a
set of facts giving rise to rights flowing both to and from a defendant. For
solution of the incidental jurisdictional problems which often attend utilization
of the procedure, the concept of ancillary jurisdiction, which long antedated
the Federal Rules, may often be drawn upon.
Thus the federal courts have decided to extend subject-matter jurisdiction to
embrace third-party claims because they satisfy the underlying rationale of
ancillary jurisdiction, not simply because these claims are provided for in Rule 14.
6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 1444, at 315–16 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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diversity requirement.221 However, the Court recognized that exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim asserted by an original defendant
hauled involuntarily into court against a potentially responsible third-party
defendant would be proper precisely because requiring the original
defendant to litigate the derivative-liability claims separately would be
unfair. “Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal
courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal rights or
effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit. Those practical
needs are the basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.”222 From the
standpoint of the necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction, the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over such non-diverse state law
claims of derivative liability is proper because it is necessary to prevent
the burden and unfairness that operation of the federal court’s judgment
would impose on the original defendant if separate litigation of its thirdparty claim were required. Unlike the mere possibility of duplicative
litigation or inconsistent outcomes in separate actions previously
discussed, preventing practical or legal prejudice to parties properly before
the federal court flowing directly from the operation of a federal court
judgment clearly provides a sufficient necessary and proper basis for the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Similar necessary and proper considerations support exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over claims asserted by or against parties under
other statutory provisions and federal rules designed to ensure that a
federal court’s judgment on Article III claims will be complete and
effective, and will not inflict practical prejudice on absent parties or those
before the court. For example, Rule 24 permits intervention of right by a
party that “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is
the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”223
The supplemental-jurisdiction statute properly confers jurisdiction over
non-diverse state law claims asserted by or against intervenors of right
under this provision in all federal-question cases, but carves out certain
cases in which the federal court’s original jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship.224 This exclusion was unwise as a matter of policy.225 The
221. Owen, 437 U.S. at 367–68, 377.
222. Id. at 377.
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). For a general discussion of Rule 24(a), see 7C WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 164, §§ 1906–1908 (2007).
224. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)–(b) (2000). In diversity cases, § 1367(b) precludes supplemental
jurisdiction “over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule . . . 24 . . . , or over
claims by persons . . . seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 . . . , when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
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exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over all claims asserted under Rule
24(a) in both federal-question and diversity cases is proper under a
necessary and proper analysis because entertaining such claims is
necessary to permit a federal court to enter a decree that effectively
resolves claims properly before it under Article III without legally or
practically prejudicing the interests of parties or non-parties as a result of
the direct operation of the court’s own judgment.
Many of the same considerations support exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over all Rule 19(a) “necessary” parties, who are required to be
joined “if feasible” if, in their absence, complete relief cannot be accorded
among the parties before the court; or they claim an interest in the subject
of the action and would suffer practical prejudice if not joined; or if
existing parties would be subject to a substantial risk of incurring
inconsistent obligations.226 The supplemental-jurisdiction statute
questionably excludes claims asserted by or against parties joined under
Rule 19 in diversity cases,227 but the necessary and proper model of federal
jurisdiction would sustain jurisdiction to assure that the court’s judgment
on Article III claims is complete and effective, and does not inflict
practical prejudice on either the absentees or existing parties. Similarly, in
interpleader actions involving multiple and conflicting claims to the same
“stake,”228 if one of the conflicting claims to the property or fund arises
under Article III, all others should be entertained supplemental to the
court’s jurisdiction over that claim to permit the court to render a fair and
effective decree. In this light, the federal interpleader statute, which
authorizes federal jurisdiction over actions in the nature of interpleader
requirements of section 1332.” Id. § 1367(b).
225. Professor Freer has criticized the statute’s treatment of supplemental jurisdiction over
intervenors of right in diversity cases. Freer, supra note 4, at 475–79; see also Arthur & Freer,
Grasping at Straws, supra note 11, at 966–78 (elaborating on the criticisms of the previously cited
article). Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane also note the undesirability of prohibiting
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases under Rules 19 and 24. 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
164, § 1610, at 152–53 & n.23.
226. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) (establishing conditions for mandatory joinder of parties). See
generally 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, §§ 1601–11.
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (providing that in cases in which original jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction . . . over
claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule . . . 19 . . . , or over claims by persons
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 . . . when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332”).
228. FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (permitting parties with inconsistent claims against a plaintiff to be
joined as interpleader defendants); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (West 2007) (defining
the jurisdiction, venue, and procedure of federal courts regarding interpleader practice). See
generally 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, §§ 1701–21 (discussing interpleader). Professors
Wright, Miller, and Kane note that supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised “if the interpleader
claim is attached to an otherwise jurisdictionally sufficient related claim.” Id. § 1710, at 582–83.
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when any two adverse claimants are of diverse citizenship even though
other claimants are not diverse, is valid, not because of the formal
presence of “minimal diversity” of citizenship, but because the exercise of
such jurisdiction is necessary to permit the federal court fairly and
effectively to dispose of claims falling within the scope of Article III.229
Similar necessary and proper considerations clearly support the
important category of class actions authorized by Rule 23(b)(1).230 That
subdivision permits class actions if the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are
satisfied and if maintaining separate actions would create a risk of
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members which would establish “incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class,” or if individual adjudications with respect
to class members would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the
interests of non-parties or substantially impair their ability to protect their
interests.231 Such class actions satisfy the requirements of a necessary and
proper model of federal jurisdiction because they are necessary to ensure
that the court’s decree as to some class members does not unfairly
prejudice the interests of the parties before the court or those of the absent
class members.
Viewed in this light, Professor Matasar’s recognition that, in certain
contexts, the federal courts have upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over
claims that have no factual relationship with Article III claims supports his
conclusion that a transactional or other factual relationship is not the sine
qua non for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.232 The cases do not,
however, support his further conclusion that the scope of the Article III
case is as broad as Congress or the rules drafters may choose. Rather, the
primary examples that he cites—conflicting claims to a specific res within
the control of the federal court, and federal bankruptcy and receivership
proceedings—all involve situations in which a federal court must assert
jurisdiction over all of the conflicting claims to specific property or limited
assets in order effectively and fairly to resolve claims to the same property
or assets properly brought before the court under Article III.233
229. See Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 632–33 (discussing State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967)).
230. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
233. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is properly vested by Congress in the federal courts pursuant to
its power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The bankruptcy proceedings themselves clearly “arise under” the
federal bankruptcy laws, and the adjudication of non-diverse state law claims by or against the
bankruptcy estate should be viewed as “ancillary” to that core Article III function to permit the fair
and effective exercise of the bankruptcy jurisdiction. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Matasar, supra note 22, at 1470–74. Federal
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2. Permissive Counterclaims
From the standpoint of the necessary and proper model of federal
jurisdiction, Professors Green and Fletcher’s position that supplemental
jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims should be recognized despite
the absence of a transactional relationship among claims is correct.234 That
is not simply because, as Matasar contends, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize the joinder of such claims.235 Rather, it is because
such jurisdiction is necessary and proper to permit the court to fairly and
efficiently resolve the plaintiff’s main claim, which falls within the scope
of Article III.
This conclusion is most apparent with respect to the historic
jurisdiction involving liquidated counterclaims asserted defensively by
way of set-off, but the same rationale would extend to all permissive
counterclaims that seek simply to reduce or defeat the plaintiff’s recovery.
As Fletcher recognized, unless jurisdiction over such claims is upheld, an
affirmative judgment by the federal court on the plaintiff’s claim might
become an instrument of unfairness by depriving the defendant of the only

court jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters is conferred by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West 2007); see
also Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006) (“Federal jurisdiction in this case is premised
on 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the statute vesting in federal district courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases
and related proceedings.”).
Matasar’s example of the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over claims falling below the
jurisdictional amount through the process of “aggregation” of all of the claims of a single plaintiff
against a single defendant, see Matasar, supra note 22, at 1466–67, is not relevant because the
jurisdictional amount requirement is purely statutory. Clearly all claims between adverse parties
of diverse citizenship fall within the scope of Article III regardless of the amount in controversy.
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), the Supreme Court held
that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute reversed the long-standing rule prohibiting the
aggregation of claims joined by multiple plaintiffs under Rules 20 and 23. Id. at 549, 558. However,
the Court concluded that the language of the statute did not overrule the complete-diversity
requirement itself, as some courts had held. See id. at 553 (“[W]e have consistently interpreted
§ 1332 as requiring complete diversity: In a case with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants,
the presence in the action of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives
the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.”). Even if Congress should
alter this result, however, the conclusion that supplemental jurisdiction might be exercised over
non-diverse state law claims joined with those asserted by diverse plaintiffs or against diverse
defendants joined under Rule 20 should not rest on the formal presence of “minimal diversity”
between any two parties in the action, which does not in itself supply a necessary and proper basis
for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over such claims. See Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note
21, at 686–92. Rather, given the “same transaction” joinder standard of Rule 20, the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction would be sustained under the “deterrence” rationale previously discussed.
See supra text accompanying notes 182–87.
234. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 175–79; Green, supra note 43, at 282–89.
235. See Matasar, supra note 22, at 12–14.
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security it has for the payment of its own claim.236 Under a necessary and
proper analysis, a federal court should have the power to exercise
jurisdiction in a way that will prevent its own judgments from unfairly
disadvantaging parties properly before the court.237
The remaining question is whether it is also necessary and proper for
the federal court to entertain non-jurisdictional permissive counterclaims
that seek affirmative recovery from the plaintiff rather than merely to
reduce the plaintiff’s recovery. One argument that supports allowing an
affirmative recovery comes from Green’s observation that procedural rules
should seek to avoid piecemeal litigation and to achieve the
comprehensive and efficient disposition of factually related claims.238 This
view would draw support from the obvious efficiency-based rationale of
Gibbs itself.239 As I have argued, however, such considerations of
efficiency do not, in themselves, justify the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction.240 The focus of supplemental-jurisdiction analysis should be
on whether its exercise is necessary and proper to permit the federal courts
to achieve intrasystem judicial economy and fairness in the resolution of
claims falling within the scope of Article III. The focus should not be on
whether intersystem judicial economy between federal and state courts will
be attained. If federal courts can fairly and efficiently resolve claims
falling within their jurisdiction without entertaining related or unrelated
non-diverse state law claims as well, the fact that concurrent or
prospective state court litigation might result in duplicative proceedings
regarding the same subject matter should not alone provide a basis for the
exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction over those non-jurisdictional
claims.
Nevertheless, the necessary and proper view of supplemental
jurisdiction would sustain the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
permissive counterclaims seeking affirmative recovery as well as those
used defensively by way of set-off. Most obviously, as Green noted, until
the claim and counterclaim have been tried, it cannot be known with

236. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 172.
237. See supra Part IV.D.1; cf. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375
(1994) (recognizing the power of federal courts to effectuate their decrees). See infra Part IV.D.4
for a discussion of Kokkonen.
238. Green, supra note 43, at 271 (“Two court actions should not be encouraged where one
will do. The principle that piecemeal litigation is undesirable has been repeatedly recognized by
the federal courts in their opinions and rules of court.”); see also id. at 272 (“The attainment of trial
convenience and efficiency should be recognized as the prevailing public policy toward the federal
courts.”).
239. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that the doctrine
of supplemental jurisdiction is grounded in “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants”).
240. See Floyd, Minimal Diversity, supra note 21.
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certainty whether the judgment on the counterclaim will operate only
defensively or will support affirmative recovery.241 Under long-established
doctrine, jurisdictional issues should be settled at the outset, and
jurisdiction, once obtained, is not divested by subsequent events, such as,
for example, the failure to recover the jurisdictional amount.242
Additionally, subsequent litigation of the same counterclaim in state
court would be limited to issues regarding the amount of damages. All
pivotal issues of liability would have been determined in the previous
federal counterclaim proceedings. Even if the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim to the extent the claim sought
affirmative recovery, the federal court’s liability determinations should be
accorded issue preclusive effect.243 Permitting the assertion of federal
jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims to their full extent would thus
ensure that the federal judgment would be accorded the finality it
deserves244 and would not involve a significant intrusion on state
sovereignty. Exercising federal supplemental jurisdiction over permissive
counterclaims might also be necessary and proper to avoid subjecting
litigants to a procedural system that permits them to avoid the unfairness
that may result from failing to assert counterclaims defensively by way of
set-off only at the cost of exposing themselves to duplicative litigation (at

241. See Green, supra note 43, at 278–81.
242. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3608, at 430 (Supp. 2007) (“Once jurisdiction
is established it cannot be divested by subsequent events.”).
243. Cf., e.g., Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380–81 (1985)
(citing previous decisions establishing that state court judgments may have issue-preclusive effect
in subsequent federal litigation of claims falling within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts, despite the general rule that the judgment of a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim does not preclude later litigation of that claim in a court that has
jurisdiction); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982) (cited in Marrese); Becher
v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391–92 (1929) (cited in Marrese); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 4, § 4423, at 602 (2002) (“Preclusion problems emerging from the relative jurisdictional
competence of different courts generally arise . . . between state and federal courts. . . . Today, the
tendency is to allow preclusion unless the first court followed severely limited procedures or there
is a clear and strong policy requiring independent redetermination by the second court.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. e (1982) (stating that an earlier state court
decision may be given issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal action that falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts).
244. For this reason, the Anti-Injunction Act permits federal courts to enjoin state proceedings
to “protect or effectuate” their judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). This permits federal courts
to enforce the claim- and issue-preclusive effect of judgments they have previously entered. 17A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 4226, at 108–13 (2007) (“[T]here are many cases in which
injunctions have issued to prevent relitigation of matters that have been finally decided by a federal
court. If the state action is an attempt to relitigate a claim that has been litigated in federal court,
claim preclusion . . . applies . . . . Even if the claims are different, issue preclusion . . . applies to
those issues that were actually determined in the first suit, and the federal court has power . . . to
effectuate its judgment by enjoining relitigation of issues it has determined.” (footnotes omitted)).
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least on the issue of damages) in state court if they wish to obtain full
recovery. In these circumstances, absent the ability to seek full recovery
on a permissive counterclaim in federal court, a party possessing a claim
for set-off might be deterred from invoking the federal forum. This would
provide a basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a
permissive counterclaim seeking affirmative recovery under the
“deterrence” rationale discussed above.
3. Removal of “Separate and Independent” Claims
Another example supporting the view that the scope of the Article III
“case” or “controversy” extends beyond factually related claims is the
statutory provision for removal of “separate and independent” claims
falling within the federal-question jurisdiction joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims.245 In that event, the “entire case,”
including the otherwise non-removable state law claims, may be removed
to federal court.246 Clearly, this statute contemplates that the federal district
court may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the separate
and independent state law claims whose removal is authorized even
though they may be factually unrelated to the removable federal-question
claim with which they are joined.
The long and convoluted evolution of the current version of the statute
has been recounted at length.247 In brief, the statute traces its origins to an
1866 statute that authorized the removal of “‘separable controvers[ies]
between citizens of different states,’” leaving the remainder of the action
in state court.248 In 1948, the statute was amended to limit its application
to “separate and independent” claims or causes of action that would be
removable under either the diversity or federal-question jurisdiction if sued
upon alone joined with otherwise non-removable state law claims or
causes of actions.249 The 1948 revision authorized the removal of the entire
action, including the “otherwise non-removable claims.”250 In American
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,251 the Supreme Court interpreted the

245. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. IV 2004) (“Whenever a separate and independent claim or
cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title [conferring “arising
under” jurisdiction] is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action,
the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.”).
246. See id.
247. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 3724, at 3–10 & nn.3–20 (1998).
248. Id. § 3724, at 4 & n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat.
306).
249. Id. § 3724, at 6.
250. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. 1441(c).
251. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
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“separate and independent” language very narrowly on the ground that
Congress intended the 1948 amendment to narrow the application of the
previous law authorizing removal of “separable” controversies.252 The
Court stated that a claim was “separate and independent” only if it sought
recovery for a different violation of the plaintiff’s legal rights for which
separate recovery might be obtained, and strongly implied that factually
related claims against different defendants seeking recovery for the same
wrong did not satisfy this test.253 The Court’s interpretation of the statute
appeared to eliminate its valid application in diversity cases and, perhaps
for this reason, Congress again amended the statute in 1990 to limit its
application to federal-question cases.254
This limitation created an additional puzzle, however. As respected
commentators have observed, if claims were sufficiently factually related
to fall within Gibbs’s “common nucleus of operative fact” formulation of
the scope of federal supplemental jurisdiction, they could be removed

252. Id. at 16.
253. Id. at 13–14. In Finn, the plaintiff, a Texas citizen, sued three defendants: two insurance
companies, one a Florida corporation and the other an Indiana corporation, and one individual, the
local agent of both insurance companies, who was a Texas citizen. Id. at 7–8. The defendants
removed the action to federal court and subsequently lost their claim on the merits. Following the
defeat, one of the insurance companies moved to vacate the district court’s decision on the grounds
that it lacked jurisdiction because there was not complete diversity between the adverse parties. The
district court denied the motion to vacate, and the court of appeals affirmed. In affirming, the court
of appeals stated that this action would have been removable under both the pre-1948 and post1948 removal statutes. See id.
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the purposes of the 1948 revisions to the removal
statute included a “simplification to avoid the difficulties experienced in determining the meaning
of” the prior version of the removal statute and to “limit removal from state courts.” Id. at 9–10,
16. The Court concluded that the 1948 revision required a controversy that “constitutes a separate
and independent claim or cause of action.” Id. at 11. It defined “cause of action” in factual terms,
stating that “‘a cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right
which the facts show.’” Id. at 13 (quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)).
Applying these legal principles, the Court looked to the plaintiff’s complaint and concluded that
each claim sought relief for “the failure to pay compensation for the loss on the property.” Id. at
14. The allegations involving the non-diverse individual defendant relied upon “substantially the
same facts and transactions as [did] the allegations in the first portion of the complaint against the
foreign insurance companies.” Id. at 16. The Court concluded that there were no “separate and
independent claims for relief as § 1441(c) require[d]” and thus no right to removal. Id.
254. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 3724, at 8–10 & nn.19–20 (1998). Wright,
Miller, and Cooper note that the 1990 revision to the removal statute restricts “the availability of
removal involving a ‘separate or independent claim or cause of action’ to situations in which the
jurisdictionally sufficient claim providing the predicate for removal falls within the subject matter
jurisdiction conferred by Section 1331—the general federal question statute.” Id. § 3724, at 8–9.
Although the 1990 amendment was intended to reduce the amount of diversity-based litigation in
federal courts, the “‘separate and independent claim or cause of action’ language in the statute,
which has caused much of the confusion in the past, has remained unchanged.” Id. § 3724, at 9–10.
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under § 1441(a) and (b) of the Judicial Code.255 Thus, the “separate and
independent claim or cause of action” removal provision of § 1441(c)
appeared to independently apply only when a federal-question claim was
joined with an otherwise non-removable state law claim that did not arise
from a common nucleus of operative fact as the federal-question claim
with which it was joined. If the Gibbs “common nucleus” formulation
defines the scope of the Article III “case,” this would suggest that the
statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the removal of factually
unrelated non-diverse state law claims that would not be removable under
the general removal provisions of § 1441(a) and (b).256

255. See infra note 256.
256. Respected commentators have also noted that it is possible to read the statute as creating
a “tripartite” classification under which some claims would be so related to a federal question as
to be removable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 (a) and (b), while others would fall outside that category
but still would be closely enough related to the removable federal-question claim not to be
removable under the “separate and independent” claim provision of § 1441(c), while still others
would be so factually unrelated to the federal-question claim that the entire action could be
removed under the latter provision. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 3247, at 62 (1998).
The authors criticize this possibility as “absurd because of its complexity, and the practical
impossibility of drawing the requisite lines in a coherent and consistent manner,” but they
acknowledge that some scholars and courts have read the statute in that way. Id. Whatever the
resolution of this conundrum, either interpretation recognizes that the statute authorizes the removal
of claims that are so factually unrelated to the plaintiff’s main federal-question claim that they do
not satisfy the Gibbs test or even the “loose factual relationship” test that some courts have
suggested as an alternative definition of the Article III case. See supra text accompanying notes
79–107.
One scholar has suggested that § 1441(c) could have constitutional application even if Gibbs
defines the scope of the Article III case, but he does not dispute that the statute would be
unconstitutional in some circumstances. See Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and Abused
Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1099, 1150–55 (1995). Hartnett posits that those who argue that § 1441(c) is
unconstitutional because it grants federal courts jurisdiction over claims not encompassed by Gibbs
fail to recognize the distinction between the constitutionality of removing an entire case and the
constitutionality of ultimately adjudicating that entire case. Id. at 1153–54. He notes that statutes
may be constitutional in certain applications and unconstitutional in others; consequently, although
§ 1441(c) may authorize federal jurisdiction in some cases where it would be unconstitutional to
do so, that does not render the statute “wholly invalid.” Id. at 1154 & n.307.
According to Hartnett, even if Gibbs defines the constitutional limit of federal jurisdiction over
claims without an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, removal of an entire case may be
authorized by Congress “so that the federal court can determine the scope of its own jurisdiction.”
Id. at 1154. “‘A primordial element of our jurisprudence is that federal courts have jurisdiction to
determine whether they have subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Shannon v. Shannon, 965
F.2d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1992)). Hartnett believes that it should be no more controversial to permit
removal of an entire case under § 1441(c) than it currently is for a plaintiff to bring an action in
federal court where the court later determines that it has no jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, without
§ 1441(c), “if a defendant removes a case that includes a claim outside the federal court’s
jurisdiction, the district court is obliged to remand the entire case because § 1441(a) permits
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On the other hand, if one were to conclude, as Matasar correctly did,
that the scope of the Article III case is not limited to claims that satisfy the
Gibbs “common nucleus” formulation,257 then the constitutional objections
to § 1441(c) would be ameliorated, and the Supreme Court’s apparent
assumption, in Barney v. Latham,258 that the statute was constitutional in

removal only if the entire case is within the district court’s original jurisdiction.” Id. at 1155.
Hartnett also reviews several specific contexts in which § 1441(c) arguably operates
constitutionally. See id. at 1150–52.
257. Matasar, supra note 22, at 1463–78.
258. 103 U.S. 205 (1880). In the Limits of Minimal Diversity, I suggested an alternative
justification for Barney applying a necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction. See Floyd,
Minimal Diversity, supra note 21, at 615–16. In the diversity context, removal of diversity claims
by the defendant protects out-of-state citizens from local bias, and Congress could have reasonably
decided that a plaintiff should not have to sacrifice her initial joinder choice to achieve that
objective. Id. at 668–69. Additionally, there was some factual connection among the claims asserted
in Barney.
The dispute in Barney related to lands granted by the United States to Minnesota and then by
Minnesota to a Minnesota corporation (the railroad company) to aid in the development of a
railroad. Barney, 103 U.S. at 206. The Barney plaintiffs were two individuals—one a citizen of
Indiana, the other of Minnesota—who alleged that they were equitably entitled to an undivided
interest in the lands as a result of their contributions to the railroad and that the individual
defendants defrauded them of that interest. Id. at 206–07. The defendants consisted of a number
of individuals—all of whom were citizens of either New York, Wisconsin, or Massachusetts—and
a second Minnesota corporation (the land company) that the individual defendants formed and to
which the first Minnesota corporation conveyed all the unsold land from the grant from Minnesota.
Id. at 206. The plaintiffs requested relief in two respects: (1) that the individual defendants give an
accounting of the sale of the land prior to the conveyance to the land company, and (2) that the land
company account for the proceeds of all land sold since the conveyance and convey an undivided
interest in the remaining lands to the plaintiffs. Id. at 207–08. The individual defendants removed
the action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, whereupon the court remanded the
action to state court for lack of complete diversity because one of the plaintiffs was a Minnesota
citizen, as was the land company. Id.
The Supreme Court determined that the remand was erroneous and that the federal court could
properly assert jurisdiction over all of the claims brought by the plaintiffs. Id. at 216. The Court
concluded that, because the plaintiffs’ claims against the individual defendants were separate and
distinct from its claim against the Minnesota land corporation, all the plaintiffs’ claims could be
removed pursuant to the 1875 version of the removal act. Id. at 214 (“[S]ince the presence of the
land company is not essential to [the full determination of the claim against the individual
defendants], the defendants, citizens of New York, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts, were
entitled . . . to have the suit removed to the Federal court.”).
The Court noted that under the prior version of the removal statute, when an action involved
claims between diverse parties that could be concluded without the presence of non-diverse parties,
removal of only the diverse controversy was proper, leaving the plaintiff to pursue some of her
claims against the non-diverse defendants in state court while pursuing the diverse defendant in
federal court. Id. at 212. The 1875 revision, however, worked “radical changes in the law regulating
the removal of causes from State courts.” Id. Because of the confusion, embarrassment, and
increased cost of litigation—and to enhance convenience—Congress opted in 1875 to allow
removal of the separable controversy to “transfer the whole suit to the Federal court.” Id. at 212–13.
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the diversity context, might inferentially support Matasar’s rules-based
model of the federal constitutional case. On closer examination, however,
this argument is unpersuasive. Instead, the statute’s constitutionality may
be sustained by applying a necessary and proper model of federal
jurisdiction.
Some commentators supporting the constitutionality of the statute have
argued that the scope of original jurisdiction is not inexorably tied to that
of removal jurisdiction and, in the latter context, a transactional
relationship is not the sine qua non of constitutionality, but they have
failed adequately to justify their argument.259 In a leading case considering
the constitutionality of § 1441(c), however, Judge Weinstein concluded
that § 1441(c) was constitutional as applied to separate and independent
claims in a diversity case by applying a necessary and proper rationale.260

259. As a leading treatise points out, the supporters of § 1441(c)’s constitutionality were led
by Professors Moore and VanDercreek. 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 3724, at 65 & n.107
(1998) (citing James Moore & William VanDercreek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim Removal Problems:
The Separate and Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46 IOWA L. REV. 489, 495–98 (1961),
and Marilyn J. Ireland, Entire Case Removal Under 1441(c): Toward a Unified Theory of
Additional Parties and Claims in Federal Courts, 11 IND. L. REV. 555, 574–76 (1978)). Moore and
VanDercreek point out that even though § 1441(c) grants broader removal jurisdiction than original
jurisdiction, this “means only that statutory removal is broader than statutory original jurisdiction.”
Moore & VanDercreek, supra, at 496. Moore and VanDercreek saw no constitutional prohibition
to Congress’s decision to grant broader removal jurisdiction than original jurisdiction. Id. at 498.
They pointed to examples, such as a plenary suit involving a federal receiver, in which federal
courts may adjudicate claims that have no connection with the main claim giving rise to the federal
receivership. Id. at 497–98. Thus, they concluded, “The fact that [the non-jurisdictional claim] is
unrelated to [the jurisdictional claim] does not necessarily put it beyond the pale of ancillary
jurisdiction.” Id. at 498.
260. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
In Taylor, Twentieth Century Fox sued actors Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor alleging five
causes of action sounding in both contract and tort. Id. at 914. The first and fifth causes of action
were against Taylor personally, while the second cause of action was against Burton personally.
The third and fourth causes of action were against Taylor and Burton severally and jointly. It was
clear to the court that, had Burton been the only defendant, removal would have been proper based
on diversity of citizenship. Conversely, had Taylor been named as the sole defendant, removal
would have been improper because she was a foreign domiciliary and therefore was not a citizen
of any state. Id. at 915. Named together, the court concluded that all the claims against Taylor,
except one, were removable under § 1441(c) because they were separate from the second cause of
action against Burton alone, which was removable. Id.
Having concluded that the action was properly removed under § 1441(c), the court turned to
Twentieth Century’s alternative argument that § 1441(c) was an unconstitutional grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts because it exceeded the scope of Article III. Id. at 918. The court
presented four reasons why § 1441(c) was not unconstitutional. The first, mentioned only briefly,
was that statutes are entitled to a “presumption of constitutionality.” Id. at 919. Second, § 1441(c)
and its predecessors received approval from numerous federal courts in more than one hundred
years of jurisprudence. Id. Third, the court rejected Twentieth Century’s argument that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), requiring complete
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He argued that even though the diversity claim at issue was “separate and
independent” from the non-removable claims in the action under the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of that term, removal of the entire
action was proper to achieve the efficient and economical disposition of
all of the interrelated claims.261
Despite the correctness of his necessary and proper approach, Judge
Weinstein’s analysis ultimately was deficient because achieving
intersystem judicial economy, standing alone, does not provide a sufficient
necessary and proper justification for the removal of non-diverse state law
actions and claims even though they may be factually related to claims
pending before a federal court. Such parallel state court litigation, even
though it may be untidy, does not significantly interfere with a federal
court’s ability to resolve the Article III claims properly pending before it.
In any event, Judge Weinstein’s necessary and proper rationale does not
apply in the present context because it posits a factual overlap between
simultaneously pending federal and state actions, even though the claims
asserted may be “separate and independent” under Finn’s narrow
interpretation of that phrase. In contrast, the conundrum posed by the
application of § 1441(c) in the federal-question context arises from the fact
that the statute appears to authorize the removal of non-diverse state law
claims that have no factual relationship with the federal-question claim
that supplies the basis for removal.
A leading treatise suggests an alternative necessary and proper
rationale for removal of factually unrelated state law claims under
§ 1441(c) in the federal-question context—namely, the “deterrence”
rationale previously discussed.262 Thus, § 1441(c) arguably provides “a
legitimate way for Congress to protect the defendant’s right of removal
under Section 1441(a) because it reduces the possibility that the invocation
of the removal right might well force the defendant to litigate in two
forums, which very well might inhibit the use of removal.”263 This
diversity of citizenship between opposing parties, was constitutionally based. Id. at 919–20.
Fourth, the court relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause, noting that Congress “manifested
concern lest the removal jurisdiction result in the fragmentation of litigation.” Id. at 920. The court
based the entire concept of removal jurisdiction on Congress’s power “‘[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all Powers vested by this
Constitution.’” Id. at 921 (alterations in original) (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257
(1880)). It also noted that “the expansive ‘necessary and proper’ clause frequently ha[d] been relied
upon to sustain judicial power beyond the strict limits of Article III.” Id. (emphasis added).
261. Id. at 921–22 (“To splinter the case and to require a separate trial in this Court, and
another in the State Court as to those claims, would needlessly waste the time and effort of all
concerned—litigants, witnesses, counsel and courts.”). The court remanded one of the claims that
bore no factual relationship to the others. Id. at 922.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 182–88.
263. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 3724, at 65 (1998).
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argument also is subject to question, however. As discussed above,
significant “deterrence” of invocation of a federal forum to resolve Article
III claims should not result from the prospect that entirely unrelated state
law claims might be litigated separately in state court.264 Trying the claims
together would not achieve judicial economies, nor would any be lost by
trying them separately. Moreover, in view of the lack of a factual
relationship among the claims, a state court defendant might frequently
prefer a separate trial, which a court would likely order in any event.
Additionally, a federal district court would likely exercise its discretion
under § 1441(c) to remand such unrelated state law claims for separate
trial in state court.265
Even if these necessary and proper arguments were unpersuasive
however, Matasar’s expansive conclusion would not follow because a
valid necessary and proper justification for § 1441(c) still exists. The
joinder of all the claims at issue was a benefit that flowed naturally from
the plaintiff’s original choice of a state forum. Congress might reasonably
have concluded that such a litigant, having properly invoked the state
forum and its attendant joinder rules, should not be deprived of that
advantage in the event the plaintiff were involuntarily forced to litigate in
a federal court as a result of the defendant’s removal under § 1441(c). The
removal of the entire case, coupled with the district court’s discretion to
remand unrelated matters, appears to have been a reasonable effort to
achieve the purposes of Article III without unduly intruding on the
advantages that flowed from the plaintiff’s initial choice of a state forum.
This view would draw support from the Supreme Court’s recognition,
in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,266 that claims of
264. See supra text accompanying notes 182–88.
265. This was what happened in the Taylor case previously discussed. See supra note 261.
266. 437 U.S. 365 (1978), superceded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113–14 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)). The facts
of Owen are well known to all first-year law students of civil procedure. Kroger, an Iowa citizen
acting as administratrix of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful-death claim in federal court
based on diversity of citizenship against the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), alleging
negligence in the operation, construction, and maintenance of a power line that electrocuted
Kroger’s husband when a boom crane passed too close to the power line. Id. at 367–68. OPPD
impleaded Owen, the owner and operator of the crane, which was a Nebraska corporation. Id. at
368. Kroger then amended her complaint to name Owen as a defendant. OPPD’s motion for
summary judgment was granted, leaving only Kroger and Owen in the litigation. During trial it was
revealed that Owen’s principal place of business was in Iowa, although it appeared to be in
Nebraska owing to an irregular avulsion of the Missouri River. Complete diversity was therefore
lacking. Id. at 374. The district court denied Owen’s motion to dismiss and entered judgment in
favor of Kroger. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 369.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to allow a plaintiff to join only diverse defendants
and then wait for the defendants to implead any non-diverse parties against whom the plaintiff
might assert a claim would defeat the congressional policy of requiring complete diversity under
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supplemental jurisdiction by parties occupying a defensive position should
be viewed more leniently than those by parties who invoke a federal forum
offensively.267 In Owen, the Court interpreted the diversity jurisdiction
statute to preclude an original plaintiff from asserting a transactionally
related but non-diverse state law claim against a third-party defendant. At
the same time, the Court recognized and appeared to endorse settled
authority permitting an original defendant to implead a non-diverse thirdparty defendant.268 The Court distinguished the supplemental-jurisdiction
issue presented by these contexts, stating:
[T]he nonfederal claim here was asserted by the plaintiff,
who voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state-law claim in
a federal court. By contrast, ancillary jurisdiction typically
involves claims by a defending party haled into court against
his will . . . . A plaintiff cannot complain if ancillary
jurisdiction does not encompass all of his possible
claims . . . since it is he who has chosen the federal rather
than the state forum and must thus accept its limitations.269
In the context of removal of separate and independent state law claims
under § 1441(c), the original plaintiff, rather than the defendant, occupies
a “defensive” position with respect to the choice of a federal forum. Thus,
Article III should permit the plaintiff to preserve the original joinder
advantage she properly obtained in state court in the event of removal by
the defendant. That is true even though, as previously discussed, the
absence of any factual relationship among the claims at issue would have
precluded the plaintiff from joining them under the supplemental
jurisdiction of the federal court had she originally chosen to litigate in a
federal forum. The necessary and proper approach properly suggests that,
as a constitutional matter, the scope of federal removal jurisdiction may
differ from the scope of federal original jurisdiction, notwithstanding the

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Id. at 373–74. Thus, it was not sufficient to establish ancillary jurisdiction
for a non-diverse claim to arise from the “common nucleus of operative fact” as required by Gibbs.
Id. at 374–75. The Court stated that the context in which ancillary jurisdiction was sought was
“crucial.” Id. at 376. In Owen, ancillary jurisdiction was improper because (1) the claim against
Owen was not dependent on the claim against OPPD and (2) the plaintiff was asserting the nondiverse claim and could not complain that she was unable to conveniently try all her claims in the
same action when she could have easily brought all her claims in a single state court proceeding.
Id.
267. See id. at 376.
268. Id. at 375 (“It is true . . . that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over nonfederal claims
has often been upheld in situations involving impleader, cross-claims or counterclaims.”).
269. Id. at 376.
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long statutory tie between the two in the general removal provisions of the
Judicial Code.
This conclusion once again illustrates the importance of “context and
purpose” in assessing supplemental-jurisdiction issues that flow naturally
from a necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction. By contrast,
such nuanced considerations are lacking under supplemental-jurisdiction
tests that turn on mechanical invocation of a “factual relationship” test,
without further inquiry into whether such joinder is necessary to achieve
the purposes underlying the limited grants of federal jurisdiction
enumerated in Article III.
4. Orders Necessary to Ensure Fair and Comprehensive Disposition
of Claims Falling Within the Scope of Article III and to
Effectuate the Court’s Decree
Finally, the necessary and proper model of federal jurisdiction takes
ample account of situations in which a federal court must exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims to permit the
court fairly and completely to resolve Article III claims that are properly
before it and to effectuate the court’s decree.
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,270 the
Supreme Court held that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to
enforce the terms of a private settlement agreement between the parties to
a previous federal action unless an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction supports the action or unless the court in the previous action
either incorporated the settlement agreement into the terms of its dismissal
order or expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.271 The
Court reasoned that enforcing the settlement was “more than just a
continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own
basis for jurisdiction.”272 Rejecting the claim that the doctrine of
“ancillary” jurisdiction permitted enforcement of the agreement, the Court
placed its prior supplemental-jurisdiction cases into two categories. First,
“to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying
respects and degrees, factually interdependent.”273 I have discussed the
“factual relationship” basis for supplemental jurisdiction—and the limits
that should be placed on it—at length above.

270. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
271. Id. at 381.
272. Id. at 378. Thus, because a settlement agreement is a private contract governed by state
law, no federal jurisdiction to enforce it would exist unless the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction were satisfied. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2007).
273. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
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Second, the Court clarified that the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction is proper “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to
manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees.”274 The Court then distinguished cases in which a federal district
court expressly reserved jurisdiction over the settlement, or incorporated
the settlement’s terms into the final order of dismissal, from the case in
Kokkonen, where it had not done so. In the former situations, enforcing the
settlement would be necessary to enforce the court’s order,275 in the latter
it would not.
Kokkonen thus provides the clearest illustration of the inadequacy of
a purely fact-based model of federal supplemental jurisdiction. Kokkenen’s
“second category” of supplemental jurisdiction, which rings distinctly in
necessary and proper tones, properly authorizes exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over non-diverse state law claims where it is necessary to
vindicate the court’s authority and enforce its orders. When this
authorization is combined with the long-standing recognition of the
appropriateness of exercising supplemental jurisdiction where the failure
to do so will result in an incomplete decree or, as a practical matter, will
prejudice existing parties or absent persons possessing an interest in the
subject matter of the action,276 and with the recognition that supplemental
jurisdiction may appropriately be based on a factual relationship among
claims where necessary to assure unimpeded access to federal court by
those possessing claims encompassed by Article III, a more complete and
satisfactory description of the scope of federal supplemental jurisdiction
emerges.
Kokkonen also explains why Matasar’s final example of contexts in
which supplemental jurisdiction has been recognized—the authority of
federal courts to resolve attorneys’ fee disputes in cases properly pending
before them even though they present only non-diverse state law
claims277—does not support the broad rules-based delegation model that
he advocates. As the Second Circuit recently recognized in a
comprehensive and thoughtful examination of the subject,278 the question
274. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 381 (“In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.”).
276. See supra Part IV.D.1.
277. See Matasar, supra note 22, at 1475–77.
278. Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2006). The dispute in Garcia arose in the context
of a fee dispute between clients and their former attorney who had been disqualified because of a
conflict of interest. Garcia was a criminal case, but as the Second Circuit recognized, civil actions
are indistinguishable with respect to the supplemental-jurisdiction issue. Id. at 209–10. Civil cases
recognizing such ancillary jurisdiction include: Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841,
844 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[J]urisdiction over the distribution of the [disputed] settlement funds can be
sustained as ancillary to jurisdiction over the claim itself.”); Nat’l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Mercury
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of who is entitled to disputed fees in such cases, whether the contest arises
between lawyers or between clients and their attorneys, is entirely
incidental to and derivative of an underlying action that falls within the
scope of Article III.279 For that reason, fee disputes are properly and
customarily raised by motion filed in the main action, rather than solely in
independent proceedings.280 Such disputes implicate the conduct and
fairness of the court’s proceedings among lawyers, who are officers of the
court, and with respect to their clients, who are parties to the action. Fee
disputes may also affect the disposition of settlement funds within the
control of the court and affect a party’s ability to obtain and compensate
counsel of its choosing.281 Attorneys’ fees disputes relate to “the court’s
ability to ‘function successfully’” and “‘bear directly upon the ability of
the court to dispose of cases before it in a fair manner.’”282 As such, they
fall squarely within Kokkonen’s endorsement of exercising supplemental
jurisdiction to permit a court to “manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees”283 in cases properly pending before
it under Article III. A court’s power to resolve such disputes does not
imply that free-standing, non-diverse state law claims may be brought
within federal jurisdiction simply because some rule or statute may
authorize their joinder, or because they have some arguable factual
relationship to such claims.284
Typesetting Co., 323 F.2d 784, 786–87 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that a district court has
ancillary jurisdiction to “condition the substitution of attorneys in litigation pending before it upon
the client’s either paying the attorney or posting security for the attorney’s reasonable fees and
disbursements” because “[t]he termination of relations between a party in litigation in a federal
court and his attorney is a matter relating to the protection of the court’s own officers”); Petition
of Rosenman Colin Freund Lewis & Cohen, 600 F. Supp. 527, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“It is well
settled that ‘[a] federal court may, in its discretion, exercise ancillary jurisdiction to hear fee
disputes and lien claims between litigants and their attorneys when the dispute relates to the main
action, regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the main action.’” (quoting Marrero v. Christiano,
575 F. Supp. 837, 839 (S.D.N.Y.1983))); see also 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3523, at 82–83
(“[I]f the federal court has jurisdiction of the principal action, it also may hear any ancillary
proceeding therein, regardless of the citizenship of the parties, the amount in controversy, or any
other factor that normally would determine subject matter jurisdiction. The situations in which
ancillary jurisdiction has been invoked include proceedings involving attorneys’ fees . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
279. Garcia, 443 F.3d at 208–10.
280. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B) (motion for attorney’s fees should be filed within fourteen
days after the entry of judgment); see also 10 MOORE, supra note 56, § 54.150 (“Under Rule
54(d)(2), the proper method for seeking attorney’s fees, whether the basis for the fee is statutory
or equitable, is the filing of a timely motion.”).
281. See the discussion in Garcia, 443 F.3d at 208–10.
282. Id. at 208–09 (quoting Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 809 F.2d 212, 217
(3d Cir. 1987)).
283. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994).
284. The Sixth Circuit joined several of its sister circuits in holding that disputes over
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V. CONCLUSION
The supplemental-jurisdiction statute expressly authorizes the federal
courts to expand their exercise of supplemental jurisdiction to the fullest
extent permitted by Article III of the Constitution. This expansion provides
the occasion for a fresh examination of whether the “common nucleus of
operative fact” formulation articulated by the Supreme Court in Gibbs is
constitutionally based and, if not, what the constitutional standard should
be. The effect of the statute has been the demise of Gibbs as the primary
focus of supplemental-jurisdiction analysis and its replacement by a direct
inquiry into the requirements of the Constitution itself.
Recent judicial and academic exploration of this question, which has
surfaced in the context of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
permissive counterclaims and with respect to the expansive jurisdictional
provisions of legislation such as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,285
has led to the emergence of three sharply contrasting views of the proper
scope of the Article III “case” or “controversy.” Under the first view, the
boundaries of a constitutional case may be defined by Congress or the
rules drafters in any way that they please, so long as at least one claim in
the action falls within one of the enumerated categories of federal
jurisdiction set out in Article III. Under the second view, at least some
factual relationship between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims
must exist to make them part of the same constitutional case. The
attorneys’ fees are properly within a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction. In Kalyawongsa v.
Moffett, 105 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 1997), the court stated:
Lawyers are officers of the court. Their fees are part of the overall costs of the
underlying litigation. Resolution of related fee disputes is often required to
provide a full and fair resolution of the litigation. Unlike a state court judge
hearing a separate contract action, a federal judge who has presided over a case
is already familiar with the relevant facts and legal issues. Considerations of
judicial economy are at stake. Thus, we hold that although attorneys’ fee
arrangements are contracts under state law, the federal court’s interest in fully and
fairly resolving the controversies before it requires courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over fee disputes that are related to the main action.
Id. at 287–88 (emphasis added); accord Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323,
1329 (9th Cir. 1999) (“No Article III case or controversy is needed with regard to attorney fees as
such, because they are but an ancillary matter over which the district court retains equitable
jurisdiction even when the underlying case is moot.”); Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1238
(9th Cir. 1996) (“‘[C]laims for attorneys’ fees ancillary to the case survive independently under the
court’s equitable jurisdiction, and may be heard even though the underlying case has become
moot.’” (quoting Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980))).
285. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1453, 1711–1715) (West
2007).
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emerging consensus of cases taking this “factual relationship” approach
is that Gibbs’s “common nucleus” test was indeed constitutionally based.
However—contrary to the previously accepted view—that test is not
limited by the “same transaction” joinder standard that pervades the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but embraces claims having only a
“loose factual connection” to one or more claims falling within the scope
of Article III. Finally, the third view rejects both the first, rules-based
delegation model of federal supplemental jurisdiction and the second,
“factual relationship” approach. Rather, this view asks whether,
considering the particular context in which the joinder of jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional claims is presented and the purposes that joinder serves,
such joinder is “necessary and proper” to achieve the purposes underlying
Article III.
For the reasons stated in this Article, the first two models of federal
supplemental jurisdiction should be rejected. The first would permit the
unlimited expansion of the scope of the Article III to embrace a host of
non-diverse state law claims and actions filed originally in federal court
or removed from state court. Under this “delegation” model, supplemental
jurisdiction is constrained only by the discretion of Congress and the rules
drafters in enacting jurisdictional legislation and rules governing the
joinder of parties and claims. That approach would threaten large and
unwarranted accessions of federal jurisdiction—and consequent improper
intrusion on the judicial powers reserved to the states by the
Constitution—without any limiting or guiding principle and regardless of
whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the particular context
at issue would further the purposes of Article III.
The second “factual relationship” model also is deficient. Most
obviously, it is under-inclusive because it fails to consider or explain the
many contexts in which the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction has been
sustained historically despite the absence of any factual relationship
among the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims.286 Professor
Matasar correctly recognized this inadequacy in rejecting Gibbs as a
constitutional standard, but the rules-based alternative that he advocated
is unduly expansive for the reasons just discussed.
Conversely, a “factual relationship” approach to supplemental
jurisdiction is over-inclusive because it would bring within the scope of
federal supplemental jurisdiction non-diverse state law claims and
actions—even free-standing state law actions entirely between citizens of
the same state—merely because they may bear some factual relationship
to a pending federal action, even though the exercise of such jurisdiction

286. See supra Part IV.D.
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is not necessary to achieve the purposes underlying Article III.287
Additionally, the content of the “loose factual connection” standard
increasingly suggested by the courts of appeals as defining the scope of the
Article III case, and how that standard differs from the “same transaction”
joinder standard of the federal rules, remains undefined. That is because
the test is purely mechanical, applicable regardless of the context in which
joinder is proposed or the purpose that it serves. Because the “loose factual
connection” standard lacks any functional justification or tie to the
purposes of Article III, it is inherently undefined and undefinable.
Only a necessary and proper model of federal supplemental jurisdiction
adequately resolves these difficulties. Because this model focuses directly
on the context and purpose of the joinder provisions at issue, it contains
discernable limits that the rules-based delegation model of federal
jurisdiction suggested by Matasar and others lacks. It properly respects the
reserved judicial powers of the states while according ample leeway for
the promotion of legitimate federal interests, including the achievement of
judicial and litigant economy when such economy might be thought to be
necessary to achieve the purposes of Article III. Because this model is not
based on the existence of a factual relationship among claims per se, it
suffers neither from the lack of definition nor from the over- and underinclusiveness of a mechanical “some factual relationship” approach. At the
same time, it takes proper account of such a relationship in assessing
whether, in particular contexts, the joinder at issue might serve the
purposes of Article III. In a post-Gibbs world, a necessary and proper
model of federal supplemental jurisdiction provides the best path to the
future.

287. Thus, both the proposals in the Report of the ALI’s Complex Litigation Project and in
the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 would permit the removal of state court,
state law actions entirely between citizens of the same state merely because they involve some
factual relationship with an action properly pending in federal court. See supra notes 189–96 and
accompanying text.
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